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V.

State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
federal law. The legal revolution which has brought federal law to the fore
must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force of state law—for
without it, the full realization of our liberties cannot be guaranteed.1

I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of student drug testing generates divisive debate.2 Although
the recent Bush administration strongly supported drug testing of students,3
several organizations ardently opposed such programs.4 In addition to

1. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977).
2. See, e.g., Annette Fuentes, Editorial, Student Drug Tests Aren’t the Answer,
USA TODAY, June 10, 2005, at 23A; Donna Leinwand, Principal: Drug Testing Students
Works, USA TODAY, July 12, 2006, at 3A; Donna Leinwand, More Schools Test for
Drugs, USA TODAY, July 12, 2006, at 1A; Phil McKenna, Schools Urged into Divisive
Drug Crackdown, NEW SCIENTIST, Apr. 21, 2007, at 8; Sara B. Miller, Steps Toward
More Drug Testing in Schools, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 20, 2005, at 1; Shari
Roan, Put to the Test, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 2007, at F1; Michael Winerip, Drawing the
Line on Drug Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at NJ4.
3. See, e.g., Maureen Magee, Student Drug Testing Focus of S.D. Summit, SAN
DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 22, 2006, at A1; About Us, STUDENT DRUG-TESTING INSTITUTE,
http://sdti.ed.gov/about.aspx (last visited Aug. 12, 2010); O FFICE OF NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT DRUG TESTING IN SCHOOLS 4–5,
http://news. findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/drugs/schldrgtst802whrpt.pdf (last visited Aug. 12,
2010).
4. See, e.g., FATEMA GUNJA ET AL., ACLU DRUG POLICY LITIG. PROJECT, MAKING
SENSE OF STUDENT DRUG TESTING: WHY EDUCATORS ARE SAYING NO (2004), available
at http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/makingsensesdt.pdf; Press Release, Drug Policy
Alliance Network, White House Pushes Controversial Student Drug Testing Agenda at
Summit in Omaha on October 21 (Oct. 20, 2008), http://www.drugpolicy.org/news/
pressroom/pressrelease/pr102008.cfm; STUDENTS FOR SENSIBLE DRUG POLICY, ELIMINATE
THE HARMFUL AND COSTLY STUDENT DRUG TESTING GRANTS, http://ssdp.org/campaigns/
srp/drug-testing-backgrounder.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2010).
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providing political support of drug testing, the Bush administration provided
significant financial support for such programs.5 During the period from
2003 to 2008, the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) of the
Department of Education awarded approximately $30 million in grants
to school districts throughout the United States for their student drugtesting programs.6
Although the United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the drug
testing of student athletes 7 and students engaged in competitive
extracurricular activities,8 state courts have not uniformly approved of
testing such students. For example, the Supreme Courts of Indiana9 and
New Jersey 10 found the challenged student drug-testing programs
constitutional under their respective constitutions, but the Supreme Courts
of Pennsylvania11 and Washington12 ruled that drug-testing programs in
their respective states violate their state constitutions. Thus, the Supreme
Courts of Pennsylvania and Washington provide greater protection
to students under their state constitutions than the United States Supreme
Court does under the Federal Constitution.
It is not only state constitutions that may provide greater protection to
the privacy interests of students. In a number of states, legislatures have
taken steps to adopt statutes to protect the privacy interests of public school
students from random drug testing.13 Under these statutes, suspicionless
drug testing of students is prohibited.14 The school must have reasonable
suspicion before it can drug test a student.15
Since the Department of Education began granting federal funds to
public schools to implement drug-testing programs, it has awarded eight
California school districts financial support for drug testing of student

5. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL-BASED STUDENT DRUG-TESTING PROGRAMS: FY
2008 AWARDS, http://www.ed.gov/programs/drugtesting/awards.html (last updated June
4, 2008).
6. Id.
7. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).
8. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
9. Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 985 (Ind. 2002).
10. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624, 654
(N.J. 2003).
11. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 96 (Pa. 2003).
12. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (Wash. 2008).
13. See infra notes 76–88 and accompanying text.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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volunteers and those engaged in athletics and cocurricular and
extracurricular activities.16 Between 2005 and 2008, the Department of
Education awarded $1,181,245 to California school districts to initiate
and maintain drug-testing programs.17 No California court has fully
examined these programs to determine their validity under the California
Constitution.18 Before any additional California schools adopt drug-

16. In 2005, the California Grant Award Recipients were the Imperial County
Office of Education, Oceanside Unified School District, Paradise Unified School District, and
Vista Unified School District. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SCHOOL-BASED STUDENT DRUGTESTING PROGRAMS: FY 2005 AWARDS, http://www.ed.gov/programs/ drugtesting/2005
awards.html [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2005 AWARDS]. In 2006, the California
Grant Award Recipient was the Orange County Department of Education. U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., SCHOOL-BASED STUDENT DRUG-TESTING PROGRAMS: FY 2006 AWARDS, http://
www.ed.gov/programs/drugtesting/06awards.html [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2006
AWARDS]. In 2007, there were no California Grant Award Recipients. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
SCHOOL-BASED STUDENT DRUG-TESTING PROGRAMS: FY 2007 AWARDS, http://www.ed.
gov/programs/drugtesting/07awards.html [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2007 AWARDS].
In 2008, the California Grant Award Recipients were W. Hart Union High School District,
Shasta Union High School District, and the Fresno County Office of Education. U.S.
DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5.
17. 2005 California Grant Award Recipients: Imperial County Office of
Education, $300,000; Oceanside Unified School District, $175,845; Paradise Unified
School District, $47,171; Vista Unified School District, $211,008. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.,
2005 AWARDS, supra note 16. 2006 California Grant Award Recipient: Orange County
Department of Education, $124,433. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2006 AWARDS, supra note 16.
2007: No California Grant Award Recipients. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2007 AWARDS,
supra note 16. 2008 California Grant Award Recipients: W. Hart Union High School
District, $71,988; Shasta Union High School District, $100,800; Fresno County Office of
Education, $150,000. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5.
18. On December 11, 2008, during the writing of this Article, the American Civil
Liberties Union of Northern California and the law firm of Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw
Pittman LLP filed a lawsuit in Shasta County Superior Court on behalf of Benjamin
Brown challenging the constitutionality of Shasta Union High School District’s
suspicionless drug-testing program of students involved in cocurricular and extracurricular
activities. Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Lawsuit Seeks To Stop Shasta Union High School
District’s Invasive Mandatory Drug Testing Policy (Dec. 11, 2008), http://aclunc.org/
news/press_releases/aclu_lawsuit_seeks_to_stop_shasta_union_high_school_districts_
invasive_mandatory_drug_testing_policy.shtml. On May 6, 2009, Superior Court Judge
Monica Marlow granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the Shasta Union High
School District from enforcing its drug-testing program. Brown v. Shasta Union High
Sch. Dist, No. 164933 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 7, 2009), appeal docketed, No. C061972
(Cal. Ct. App. May 27, 2009); Press Release, ACLU, Student Privacy Gets an Early Win
in School Drug Testing Case (May 6, 2009), http://www.aclunc.org/news/press_releases/
student_privacy_gets_an_early_win_in_school_drug_testing_case.shtml. The school district
appealed the court’s decision on the preliminary injunction. That appeal was denied on
September 2, 2010. Brown v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., No. C061972, 2010 WL
3442147 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2010). There has not yet been a trial on the merits. Email from Michael Risher, Attorney, ACLU, to Floralynn Einesman, Professor, California
Western School of Law (Sept. 22, 2009, 09:48 PST) (on file with author).
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testing programs, the legality of these programs should be examined under
the California Constitution. This Article seeks to accomplish that task.
Part II summarizes the United States Supreme Court decisions on
student drug testing. Part III examines state law on student drug testing.
Part IV focuses on student drug testing in California. It addresses the
state’s history of, and current status with respect to, student drug testing.
It then examines provisions of the California Constitution that apply to
the subject: article I, section 1, the right to privacy; and article I, section
13, the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The
Article discusses California judicial decisions on these provisions and
then analyzes whether the drug testing of students engaged in athletics
and extracurricular activities is constitutional. Part V offers a conclusion
on the constitutionality of student drug testing under the California
Constitution.
II. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
ON STUDENT DRUG TESTING
The United States Supreme Court has sanctioned the drug testing of
students in two separate decisions. In Vernonia School District v. Acton,
the Court upheld a drug-testing program of student athletes, finding the
program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.19 Subsequently, in Board
of Education of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, the Court upheld the drug
testing of students engaged in extracurricular activities, ruling that the
program constituted a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.20
The Court dispensed with the warrant requirement in both cases by
finding “special needs” in the public school context—regulating the
conduct of the affected students rather than investigating them for a
crime.21 Consequently, the Court simply balanced the interests to determine
the reasonableness of the search.22 Weighing the “nature of the privacy
interest,” “character of the intrusion,” “nature and immediacy of the

19. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995). For a detailed
analysis of decisions on student drug testing by the United States Supreme Court, as well
as the New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Indiana Supreme Courts, see Floralynn Einesman
& Howard Taras, Drug Testing of Students: A Legal and Public Health Perspective, 23
J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 231, 234–56 (2007).
20. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002).
21. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653; see Earls, 536 U.S. at 829.
22. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 829; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
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governmental concern,” and “efficacy of this means for meeting it,” the
Court concluded in both cases that the testing programs were reasonable.23
In Vernonia, the Court found that student athletes had a low privacy
interest.24 Although all students have a reduced expectation of privacy
because they are required to submit to a myriad of rules and regulations,
student athletes should expect even less privacy than other students.25
They dress and shower together, their conduct is highly regulated, and
they must undergo medical exams in order to participate in school sports.26
Further, in Earls, the Court ruled that although students engaged in
extracurricular activities do not have as diminished an expectation of
privacy as student athletes, they too have a lesser privacy interest than
ordinary students.27 Like student athletes, they must also obey specific,
intrusive rules of conduct due to their participation in extracurricular
activities.28
In both cases, the “character of the intrusion” was found to be minimal
because there was no direct monitoring of student urination.29 The
conditions under which the students provided urine samples were similar
to those found in any public bathroom.30
The Court found the “nature and immediacy of the governmental
concern” was compelling.31 The school district sought to deter drug use
by students so as to protect the students from harm.32 Substance abuse
affected not only the specific students involved but also the entire school
community.33 It disrupted the teaching mission and resulted in a general
lack of order in the classroom. 34 Moreover, those taking the drugs
exposed themselves to serious injuries.35 Student athletes using drugs
were particularly vulnerable to such harms.36 Additionally, because student
athletes served as role models for the student community, they had the
power to influence others to experiment with drugs.37 Although the

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

686

Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654–65; see Earls, 536 U.S. at 830–38.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
Id.
Id.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 831–32.
Id. at 832.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658; see Earls, 536 U.S. at 832–33.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 832–33; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661; see Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663.
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Court found it less likely that those engaged in extracurricular activities
would act as role models to other students, it nonetheless concluded that
the nation’s drug problem among adolescents rendered this governmental
concern serious.38 In both instances, the Court concluded that the testing
program was an effective means to prevent, detect, and deter drug use.39
III. STATE LAW ON STUDENT DRUG TESTING
Relying on the above United States Supreme Court cases, local school
districts have implemented and expanded their drug-testing programs.
In addition to testing student athletes and students engaged in
extracurricular activities, schools also test students who participate in
cocurricular activities,40 those who seek permits to park on campus, or
those who attend school dances or plays.41 In response, students and
parents have challenged these programs as violating the search and
seizure clause of their respective state constitutions.42
A. State Supreme Court Decisions
Using the framework outlined in Vernonia and Earls, the supreme
courts of three states balanced the same factors as the United States
Supreme Court―nature of the privacy interest, character of the privacy
interest, nature and immediacy of the governmental concern, and
efficacy of the program―to determine the constitutionality of the
relevant policies.43 In two instances, the state high courts found the
programs constitutional,44 whereas in one case the state supreme court

38. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837–38 (2002).
39. Id. at 837; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
40. See, e.g, Linke v. Nw. Sch. Corp., 763 N.E.2d 972, 975 (Ind. 2002). “Cocurricular activities are activities, participation or membership in which [is] an extension
of and outside the normal school day and for which academic credit or grades are earned,
such as band and choir.” Id. at 975 n.1.
41. Jennifer K. Turner, A “Capricious, Even Perverse Policy”: Random, Suspicionless
Drug Testing Policies in High Schools and the Fourth Amendment, 72 MO. L. REV. 931,
932 (2007).
42. See, e.g., Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976; Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch.
Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624, 632 (N.J. 2003); Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836
A.2d 76, 80 (Pa. 2003); York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995, 999 (Wash. 2008).
43. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 979–86; Joye, 826 A.2d at 642–48; Theodore, 836 A.2d
at 88–96.
44. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 986; Joye, 826 A.2d at 648.
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found the policy unconstitutional.45 To determine how California courts
might rule on this issue under its state constitution, it is critical to
examine the reasoning of these state court decisions.
In Linke v. Northwestern School Corp., students argued that their
school district’s drug-screening program violated their right to be free
from unreasonable search and seizure under the Indiana Constitution.46
The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the program, which
tested students involved in school sports, extracurricular or cocurricular
activities, or those parking cars on campus.47 The court rejected the
need for individualized suspicion because the drug-testing policy was
not motivated by a criminal investigation of the student.48 Rather, the
court balanced the intrusion on the reduced privacy interest of the
students against the need and efficacy of the program.49 It decided the
intrusion on the students’ privacy interests was minimal, and the need
for the program was significant.50 The district’s interest in deterring
drug use and preventing harm to the students involved outweighed the
minimal privacy intrusion on the students who volunteered for these
activities and who consented to the drug testing.51
In Joye v. Hunterdon Central Regional High School Board of
Education, parents challenged the constitutionality of the district’s drugtesting policy that applied to students who participated in athletics or
extracurricular activities and those who possessed school parking
permits.52 The parents argued the policy violated article 1, paragraph 7
of the New Jersey Constitution, which prohibits “unreasonable searches
and seizures by government agents.”53
Following the United States Supreme Court’s analysis in Vernonia and
Earls, the New Jersey Supreme Court balanced the students’ “expectation
of privacy,” the search’s “relative obtrusiveness,” and the “strength of
the government’s asserted need” in conducting the testing.54 The court
found the targeted students’ privacy interests were reduced because, as
compared to the nontargeted students, they had to obey additional rules

45. Theodore, 836 A.2d at 96.
46. Linke, 763 N.E.2d at 976.
47. Id. at 975, 985.
48. Id. at 978.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 985.
51. Id. at 983–85.
52. Joye v. Hunterdon Cent. Reg’l High Sch. Bd. of Educ., 826 A.2d 624, 632
(N.J. 2003).
53. Id. at 632, 637.
54. Id. at 642–48.
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and regulations.55 Just as the United States Supreme Court found in
Vernonia, the New Jersey Supreme Court maintained that student athletes
had a lower expectation of privacy because they shared locker rooms,
showered, and undressed together.56 The court determined the degree of
obtrusiveness―the urine collection process―was minimal because the
students were permitted to use the restroom without any monitoring.57
Furthermore, the policy contained provisions to prevent false positives,
and the test results were kept confidential.58 Lastly, the court found a
need for the testing because the district had shown a significant segment
of its campus consumed prohibited drugs and alcohol.59 After considering
these factors, the court concluded the program was constitutional.60
In contrast to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in Joye, the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reached a contrary result in Theodore v.
Delaware Valley School District. 61 The court reviewed the policy
implemented by the school district, which authorized random drug screening
of students who participated in extracurricular activities, including sports,
and those who used school parking permits, to determine its reasonableness
under the search and seizure clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution.62
The court found the students’ privacy interest was significant. Moreover,
the district had not established that a drug problem affected the district
or that the tested students were using controlled substances.63 Furthermore,
the policy was overbroad; although it was aimed at student activities for
which drug use could prove dangerous, that is driving or sports, it also
targeted student clubs for which no such hazard would be presented, that
is the Scholastic Bowl or the National Honor Society.64 Finally, the policy
was not directed at students who were most prone to be drug abusers—
those not engaged in any school activity.65

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 642.
Id. at 642–43.
Id. at 643.
Id.
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 648.
Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 96 (Pa. 2003).
Id. at 79.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 91–92.
Id. at 92.
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More recently, the Supreme Court of Washington issued a divided
opinion regarding the drug testing of student athletes.66 Although all the
justices agreed the relevant policy authorizing the suspicionless testing
of student athletes violated the state constitution,67 the justices could not
reach a majority opinion as a basis for their decision. A plurality of the
court noted that in some areas, article I, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart—the
Fourth Amendment.68 Although the cornerstone of the Fourth Amendment
is “reasonableness,” that of article 1, section 7 is “authority of law”—a
warrant.69
First, the plurality found that, despite a student’s reduced expectation
of privacy, requiring a student athlete to present a urine sample for analysis
is still a significant intrusion on his right to privacy.70 Secondly, the
plurality stated that unless such an intrusion of privacy is conducted
pursuant to a warrant, the intrusion must be supported by a valid exception
rooted in the common law.71 The plurality, however, rejected the application
of the “special needs” exception used in Vernonia and Earls because it
found that, under common law, no such exception existed.72 It could find
no other exception that supported the legality of the search.73 Consequently,
the plurality found the district’s policy mandating the suspicionless drug
screening of student athletes violated article 1, section 7 of the Washington
Constitution.74
B. State Legislative Action
Some states have adopted legislation to address the issue of student
drug testing. In 2005, New Jersey passed section 18A:40A-23 of the
New Jersey Code, which allows a board of education to adopt a policy
for random drug testing of students in grades nine through twelve who

66. York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 178 P.3d 995, 998 (Wash. 2008) (plurality
opinion).
67. Id. at 1006. Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution states: “No
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of
law.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7.
68. York, 178 P.3d at 1001 (plurality opinion).
69. Id. at 1000–01.
70. Id. at 1001.
71. Id. at 1003.
72. Id. at 1005.
73. Id. at 1005–06.
74. Id. at 1006. For a more detailed analysis of York v. Wahkiakum School
District, see Jonathan F. Duncan & Kristina V. Giddings, Which Washington: Constitutions in
Conflict?, 19 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 231, 238–46 (2008).
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engage in school athletics, participate in extracurricular activities, or possess
school parking permits.75 Furthermore, section 18A:40A-12 authorizes a
“teaching staff member, school nurse or other educational personnel of
any public school” to report any student who appears to be under the
influence of a controlled substance.76 The student is then subject to
“immediate examination” by a doctor.77 The United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey interpreted this statute to require
individualized suspicion before a school district could test a student for
drug use.78
Section 49-6-4213 of the Tennessee Code permits the drug testing of
any student “if there are reasonable indications to the principal that such
student may have used or be under the influence of drugs.”79 A principal
may learn of the need to drug test a student through reasonable information
provided by a teacher, a staff member, or another student.80 The Tennessee
State Attorney General has opined that a school district may not subject
Tennessee students engaged in extracurricular activities to suspicionless,
random drug testing.81 In view of section 49-6-4213, which permits drug
testing of students only when there are “reasonable indications to the
principal that such student may have used or may be under the influence
of drugs,” the Tennessee Attorney General concluded that random drug
testing violates that statute.82
In Mississippi, the school board has the authority “[t]o prescribe and
enforce rules and regulations not inconsistent with law or with the
regulations of the State Board of Education for their own government
and for the government of the schools.”83 The Mississippi Attorney General
has opined that it would be lawful for a Mississippi school to test

75. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:40A-23 (West Supp. 2009).
76. Id. § 18A:40A-12 (West 1999).
77. Id.
78. Gutin v. Wash. Twp. Bd. of Educ., 467 F. Supp. 2d 414, 423 (D.N.J. 2006) (“It
is important to note at the outset that the policy at issue is not one of suspicionless or
random testing. Rather, the School District’s policy provides for testing only upon an
individualized suspicion that a particular student is under the influence of drugs in school.”).
79. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4213 (2002) (emphasis added).
80. Id.
81. Constitutionality of HB 2858 / SB 2653 Authorizing Student Drug Testing,
109 Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. 08-106 (2008), 2008 WL 2036776.
82. Id.
83. MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-7-301(l) (West Supp. 2009).
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students suspected of using drugs without a parent’s consent.84 As long
as there was individualized suspicion for the test, it was reasonable under
state law.85 Utah requires a person have “reasonable cause to believe that an
individual has committed a prohibited act” before notifying the principal or
other official.86 Use of drugs by a student is a prohibited act.87 If notice
is given, then an investigation may follow. A search of a student “must
be based on at least a reasonable belief that the search will turn up
evidence of a violation of this chapter.”88
On the other hand, Illinois recently adopted a law authorizing the
Illinois High School Association to randomly test high school athletes
for performance-enhancing drugs when these students are participating
in Association-sponsored events.89 The athlete’s parents must provide a
written acknowledgement of the drug-testing program before their child
is allowed to participate in the athletic program.90 Virginia authorizes
the Board of Education, in consultation with the Attorney General’s
Office, to develop “guidelines for school boards for . . . voluntary and
mandatory drug testing . . . consistent with relevant state and federal
laws and constitutional principles.”91 Nothing in the Virginia Code is to
be “construed to require any school board to adopt policies requiring or
encouraging any drug testing in schools.”92
Most states have not legislated on the issue of student drug testing.
For those states that have done so, a majority requires individualized
suspicion before a school official may compel a student to undergo a
urinalysis. No testing is permitted unless either a student consents to the
test or the school official has reasonable suspicion to believe that a
student is under the influence of a controlled substance while the student
is at school.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
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Drug Testing Policy, 377 Op. Miss. Att’y Gen. 06-00513 (2006), 2006 WL 3824135.
Id.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53A-11-1302 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009).
Id. at § 53A-11-1301.
Id. at § 53A-11-1304.
105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 25/1.5 (West 2009).
Id.
VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-279.7 (2006).
Id. § 22.1-279.6 (2006 & Supp. 2009).
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IV. STUDENT DRUG TESTING IN CALIFORNIA
A. History of Student Drug Testing in California
Student drug testing in California has had a conflicted history.93 In
August 2004, the California Legislature considered Senate bill 1386,
authored by State Senator John Vasconcellos and Assemblymember
Jackie Goldberg, requiring both parental consent and reasonable suspicion
of recent drug use by a student to test the student.94 This bill would have
prohibited suspicionless drug testing of students.95 The California Attorney
General, the California PTA, Planned Parenthood, and the NAACP
supported the bill, whereas the Office of National Drug Control Policy
and the Bush administration strongly opposed it.96 Ultimately, the California
Legislature passed a compromise measure, allowing for the drug testing
of students only with parental and student consent.97 The results of the
testing would only be provided to the parents of the tested student.98
Nonetheless, Governor Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill on September
18, 2004.99 He opined that the bill would “compromise[] local control”
and would deprive schools of the flexibility they need to make decisions
concerning their own affairs.100 The Governor stressed his desire to allow
local school districts to “make decisions based on the needs and values of
their community.”101
Since that time, various drug-testing programs have emerged in schools
throughout California. A number of California school districts have received
grants from the United States Department of Education to implement a
student drug-testing program.102 In 2005, the Imperial County Office of

93. See Roan, supra note 2, at F1.
94. S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (as amended Apr. 12, 2004).
95. Id.
96. Gabrielle Banks, State PTA Backs Ban on Random Drug Testing, L.A. TIMES,
July 19, 2004, at B1.
97. S. 1386, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (as amended Aug. 21, 2004).
98. Id.
99. To view the legislative history of S. 1386, see Bill Information, http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/bilinfo.html (enter bill and legislative session information) (last visited
Aug. 12, 2010).
100. Governor Schwarzenegger’s Message to Members of the California State
Senate Vetoing Senate Bill 1386 (Sept. 18, 2004), http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/
sen/sb_1351-1400/sb_1386_vt_20040918.html.
101. Id.
102. See infra notes 103–10 and accompanying text.
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Education received a grant of $300,000 to test students who engaged in
athletics or competitive extracurricular activities and those who volunteered
for testing.103 Oceanside Unified School District obtained a three-year
grant of $175,845 to drug test student athletes.104 Paradise Unified School
District was awarded a $47,141 grant for a three-year program to test
student athletes, student volunteers, and those engaged in competitive
extracurricular activities.105 Vista Unified School District was awarded
a three-year grant of $211,008 to test student athletes, students in
extracurricular and cocurricular activities, and student volunteers.106 In
2006, the United States Department of Education awarded the Orange
County Department of Education in Costa Mesa $124,433 to test student
athletes and students engaged in competitive extracurricular activities.107
In 2008, the Department awarded $71,988 to W. Hart Union High
School District in Santa Clarita to undertake a voluntary student drugtesting program,108 $150,000 to the Fresno County Office of Education
to test students engaged in sports or extracurricular activities,109 and
$100,800 to the Shasta Union High School District to test student athletes
and those engaged in extracurricular and cocurricular activities.110
Other California schools have offered students a voluntary drugtesting program. For the past several years, schools throughout Orange
County, California, have relied on consensual drug testing.111 Public
schools in San Clemente, Fullerton, Huntington Beach, Laguna Beach,
and Tustin have provided voluntary drug testing to its middle and high
school students.112 Carmel High School District in Northern California
103. Grant Application Submitted by Imperial County Office of Education on Aug.
13, 2005 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2005 AWARDS, supra note 16.
104. Grant Application Submitted by Oceanside Unified School District on Aug.
14, 2005 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2005 AWARDS, supra note 16.
105. Grant Application Submitted by Paradise Unified School District on Aug. 16,
2005 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2005 AWARDS, supra note 16.
106. Grant Application Submitted by Vista Unified School District on Aug. 12,
2005 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2005 AWARDS, supra note 16.
107. Grant Application submitted by Orange County Department of Education on
Aug. 14, 2006 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 2006 AWARDS supra note 16.
108. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5; WILLIAM S. HART UNION HIGH SCH. DIST.,
“THE CADRE PROGRAM”: COMPREHENSIVE ALCOHOL AND DRUG REDUCTION EDUCATION,
http://hartdistrict.org/files/docs/CADRE_Parent_Brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 12,
2010).
109. Telephone Interview with Vince Wesson, Grant Administrator, Fresno Office
of Education (Oct. 29, 2009); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5.
110. Grant Application Submitted by Shasta Union High School District on Mar.
17, 2008 (on file with author); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5.
111. Jenifer B. McKim, Students Put to the Test, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 29,
2006, http://www.ocregister.com/ocregister/homepage/abox/article_1338238.php.
112. Id.
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became the first school district in that area to institute a voluntary drugtesting program.113
B. The California Constitution and Drug Testing
Students may rely on two provisions of the California Constitution to
challenge the constitutionality of mandatory drug testing: article I,
section 1―the right to privacy; and article I, section 13―the right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.114
1. Article I, Section 1: Right to Privacy
Article I, section 1 of the California Constitution provides: “All people
are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy.”115
The right to privacy was added to the California Constitution by the
Privacy Initiative, which was adopted by the state’s voters on November
7, 1972.116 “[T]he moving force behind the new constitutional provision
was a more [focused] privacy concern, relating to the accelerating
encroachment on personal freedom and security caused by increased
surveillance and data collection activity in contemporary society.”117
“The new provision’s primary purpose is to afford individuals some measure
of protection against this most modern threat to personal privacy.”118
113. Jennifer Olney, Are School Drug Tests Invading Privacy?, ABC 7 NEWS, June
19, 2006, http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=news/assignment_7&id=4286495.
114. See CAL CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 13. Because the majority of student drug-testing
programs in California test students engaged in athletics, extracurricular, or cocurricular
activities, this Article will focus on the constitutionality of those programs.
115. Id. at art. I, § 1.
116. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994); Carmen
M. v. Superior Court (In re Carmen M.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 125 n.10 (Ct. App. 2006).
117. White v. Davis, 533 P.2d 222, 223 (Cal. 1975).
118. Id. The election brochure for the constitutional amendment sets forth its only
“legislative history”:
First, the statement identifies the principal “mischiefs” at which the amendment is
directed: (1) “government snooping” and the secret gathering of personal
information; (2) the overbroad collection and retention of unnecessary personal
information by government and business interests; (3) the improper use of
information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it
for another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party; and (4) the lack
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Minors, in addition to adults, are protected by this state constitutional
right to privacy.119 An individual who claims a violation of this right to
privacy under article I, section 1 may seek a declaratory judgment,120 an
injunction,121 or monetary damages.122
For a number of reasons, the California Supreme Court has found the
California Constitution’s right to privacy “broader and more protective
of privacy” than the right to privacy found in the Federal Constitution.123
First, the right to privacy is set forth explicitly in article I, section 1 of
the California Constitution124 rather than implicitly in the Fourth, Fifth,
and Fourteenth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.125 Additionally,
the California right protects individuals from an invasion of privacy by
private, as well as state, actors.126 Lastly, the California courts have
interpreted the right to privacy in the California Constitution as providing
greater substantive protection to individuals than its federal counterpart.127
California courts have explained that mandatory drug testing of
individuals implicates the right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the

of a reasonable check on the accuracy of existing record. Second, the statement
makes clear that the amendment does not purport to prohibit all incursion into
individual privacy but rather that any such intervention must be justified by a
compelling interest. Third, the statement indicates that the amendment is intended
to be self-executing, i.e., that the constitutional provision, in itself, “creates a legal
and enforceable right of privacy for every Californian.”
Id. at 234.
119. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 814 (Cal. 1997).
120. See, e.g., Cent. Valley Chapter of 7th Step Found., Inc. v. Younger, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 117, 122 (Ct. App. 1979).
121. See, e.g., White, 533 P.2d at 225.
122. See, e.g., Payton v. City of Santa Clara, 183 Cal. Rptr. 17, 17 (Ct. App. 1982).
But see Nesby v. City of San Francisco, No. A115620, 2009 WL 414605, at *14 n.26
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2009); Richardson-Tunnell v. Sch. Ins. Program for Emps., 69
Cal. Rptr. 3d 176, 184 (Ct. App. 2007).
123. Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808.
124. Id.; Carmen M. v. Superior Court (In re Carmen M.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117,
125–26 n.11 (Ct. App. 2006).
125. “[I]n the context of traditional search and seizure by police to detect criminal
conduct, the article I, section 1, privacy clause does not establish broader protection than
that established by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I,
section 13 of the California Constitution.” Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 264 Cal. Rptr.
194, 200 n.4 (Ct. App. 1989) (citing People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 392 (Cal. 1983)).
Mandatory drug testing of students, however, is not covered by this “traditional search
and seizure” context because the search is not conducted by the police and the testing is
not undertaken to detect criminal conduct.
126. See Leonel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 702, 712–13 (9th Cir. 2005); Hill v.
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994).
127. Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808–10.
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California Constitution.128 In 1994, the California Supreme Court examined
a drug-testing program for university student athletes.129 Due to a concern
with the use of performance-enhancing drugs such as steroids,130 the
National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), a private entity that
governs intercollegiate sporting events in the United States, adopted a
mandatory random drug-testing program of student athletes engaged in
NCAA-sponsored competitions.131 Athletes at Stanford University in
California sued the NCAA, arguing the NCAA’s drug-testing program
violated their right to privacy under article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution.132 The Supreme Court of California disagreed.133
Initially, the court had to determine the scope of the initiative because
the initiative did not specify whether it applied only to government
actors or to private actors as well.134 To do so, the court examined the
intent of the voters who supported the measure.135 The official ballot
contained arguments for and against the initiative.136 Both sides repeatedly
referred to nongovernmental, private interests as being affected by the
measure.137 Consequently, the court decided the voters intended for private,
as well as public, bodies to be covered by the initiative.138
Next, the court examined the legal standard for a claim of invasion of
privacy. The court determined that to allege an invasion of privacy in
violation of article I, section 1, a plaintiff must establish the following
elements: “(1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by
defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy.”139

128. See, e.g., Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1226 (Cal. 1997); Hill,
865 P.2d at 644; Carmen M., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 118–19; Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co.,
65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 302 (Ct. App. 1997).
129. Hill, 865 P.2d at 644.
130. William MacKnight, Drug Testing in Intercollegiate Athletics—Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 26 Cal. Rptr. 2d 834 (Cal. 1994), 5 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 529, 529 (1995); see also Hill, 865 P.2d at 659–60.
131. Hill, 865 P.2d at 637.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 641–44.
135. Id. at 642.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 644.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 657.
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A defendant may overcome the plaintiff’s case by negating any one of
these three elements or by establishing by “an affirmative defense, that
the invasion of privacy is justified.”140 A plaintiff may then rebut the
defendant’s assertion by establishing that there are alternatives to
defendant’s conduct that are less invasive of privacy.141
a. Legally Protected Privacy Interest
First, the court found the NCAA’s drug-testing program affected a
“legally protected privacy interest[].”142 By directly “monitoring an
athlete’s urination” and by “collecting and testing an athlete’s urine and
inquiring about his or her ingestion of medications,” the NCAA intruded
on the athletes’ privacy interests.143 The monitoring implicated “autonomy
privacy,” an interest in being free from observation while performing a
normally private function.144 The collecting and testing for drugs implicated
“informational privacy,” an interest in restricting access to confidential
information about one’s body.145
b. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Next, the court determined that, due to a student athlete’s participation
in intercollegiate sports, an NCAA student athlete had a reduced
expectation of privacy.146 As in Vernonia, the court found that because
athletes’ activities are highly regulated and because they shower and
undress together, their expectation of privacy is diminished.147 In
addition, they routinely share and exchange medical information with
various people, such as doctors, coaches, and trainers.148 Moreover, the
NCAA provided advance notice of the drug-testing program to the
student athletes and obtained consent from them before the testing.149
Because the students had no legal right to engage in intercollegiate
sports, they were required to adhere to the rules adopted democratically
by the NCAA.150 The court concluded that, due to the notice and
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 657–58.
Id. at 658.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 659.
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consent features of the program, the student athletes had an even lower
expectation of privacy.151
c. Serious Invasion of Privacy
Finally, the court examined the conduct of the NCAA to determine the
seriousness of the invasion of privacy.152 The court found the NCAA’s
program of direct monitoring of urination by the student athletes to be
“particularly intrusive.”153 Rather than merely handing the athlete a cup
and asking for a sample, as a doctor would do, the NCAA actually
watched as the athlete urinated.154 This invasion of privacy was serious,
despite the students’ reduced expectation of privacy.155
Additionally, the court analyzed the depth of the student athletes’
invasion of privacy when the students were asked about medical conditions
and treatments before their drug tests.156 The court decided that, in view
of the students’ reduced expectation of privacy and the routine nature of
these questions for athletes, the invasion was not significant.157
Finally, the court reviewed the competing interests behind the NCAA’s
request for medical information.158 The NCAA demanded this information
in order to ensure the accuracy and validity of the drug tests.159 This
served to accomplish the objective behind the program, protecting the
integrity of the sport through the accurate testing of the athletes.
Consequently, the court determined that the NCAA’s interest justified its
intrusion into this area.160
Because the plaintiffs established the necessary elements for a claim
of invasion of privacy, the court then examined whether the NCAA’s
actions furthered any legitimate and important competing interests.161
“A defendant may prevail in a state constitutional privacy case by negating
any of the three elements just discussed or by pleading and proving, as
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id. at 658–59.
Id. at 659.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 666.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 669.
Id. at 659–60.

699

EINSEMAN FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

9/13/2010 10:38 AM

an affirmative defense, that the invasion of privacy is justified because it
substantively furthers one or more countervailing interests.”162 The
plaintiff may then rebut the affirmative defense by establishing that less
intrusive means are available to accomplish the defendant’s objectives.163
The court examined the defendant’s countervailing interests. It
determined that the NCAA sought to protect the “integrity of intercollegiate
athletic competition” and the “health and safety of student athletes.”164
The court found the NCAA had a genuine concern in both of these
interests.165 Based on the experience of other sports organizations and due
to its own study of the issue, the NCAA had ascertained that student athletes
abused various drugs, including performance-enhancing drugs.166 Therefore,
the NCAA was appropriately concerned that this drug use would damage
intercollegiate sports by compromising competitions.167 Furthermore, as a
promoter of athletic activities, the NCAA was correctly interested in
protecting the well-being of students engaged in NCAA sports.168 A
drug-abusing athlete could exacerbate the risk of injury to himself and
others.169 Although the athletes complained that some of the tested drugs
were not performance-enhancing substances, the court found that because
the testing was legitimate, the NCAA could test for any substance whose
use was illegal or potentially dangerous.170
As a matter of law, the California Supreme Court ruled that the lower
courts had erred in requiring the NCAA to establish that its drug-testing
program promoted a “compelling interest.”171 To establish a compelling
interest, the lower courts had demanded that the NCAA prove the
following:
1.
2.
3.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

700

the program furthered its stated purposes, i.e., to safeguard the
integrity of athletic competition and to protect the health and safety
of student athletes;
the utility of the program manifestly outweighed any resulting
impairment of the privacy right; and
there were no alternatives to drug testing less offensive to privacy
interests.172

Id. at 657.
Id.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
Id.
Id. at 660–61.
Id. at 661.
Id.
Id. at 662–63.
Id. at 661.
Id. at 640.
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The court found that no such showing was required.173 The history of
the Privacy Initiative did not indicate that the supporters of the
amendment intended to have the “compelling interest” standard apply to
private entities.174 The compelling interest standard, like the “least
restrictive alternative,” applies only to defendants who are agents of the
government, not private associations like the NCAA, or actions that
“involve clear invasions of central, autonomy-based privacy rights,
particularly in the areas of free expression and association, procreation,
or government-provided benefits in areas of basic human need,”175
which were not implicated in the case before the court.176
Because the NCAA had justified its drug-testing program with
legitimate and important competing interests, the plaintiffs were required
to prove the availability of alternatives to direct monitoring.177 The
court found the plaintiffs’ options—educational programs and suspicionbased testing—were inappropriate.178 Education requires commitment
and is not effective for those who are not interested in learning about the
detrimental effects of drugs.179 Suspicion-based testing requires both
resources to observe the suspicious behavior and reliable evidence of the
suspicious behavior.180 Because the NCAA had neither consistent nor
frequent contact with the athletes, the plaintiffs could not provide adequate
proof that a suspicion-based program was feasible. Consequently, the
court found inadequate proof of either of these in the record, and it
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to prove their case.181

173. Id. at 661.
174. Id. at 654. “Nothing in this passage compels the conclusion that the phrase
‘compelling public need’ was intended to supply a single, all-encompassing legal test for
privacy rights.” Id. at 645.
175. Id. at 663.
176. Id. at 664 (“We have been directed to no case imposing on a private organization,
acting in a situation involving decreased expectations of privacy, the burden of justifying
its conduct as the ‘least offensive alternative’ possible under the circumstances. Nothing
in the language [or] history of the Privacy Initiative justifies the imposition of such a
burden; we decline to impose it.”).
177. See id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.

701

EINSEMAN FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

9/13/2010 10:38 AM

2. Refining the Hill Test
The California Supreme Court has tried to refine this constitutional
analysis in several cases that followed Hill. In Loder v. City of Glendale,
the court examined whether drug testing of city job applicants and
promotion candidates violated, inter alia, article I, section 1 of the California
Constitution.182 In a divided opinion, the plurality declared Hill’s three
elements establishing a prima facie case of invasion of privacy under
article I, section I were merely “threshold elements” that were to be used
to “screen out” trivial claims that did not implicate a substantial invasion
of privacy.183 The court stressed that even with the establishment of
these elements, the court would still have to balance the need for the
program against the intrusion on the individual’s privacy.184
With respect to promotion candidates, the court did not review drug
testing under the right to privacy because it had already found that
testing those individuals violated the Fourth Amendment.185 As to job
applicants, the court found no violation of the right to privacy.186 Although
the urinalysis intruded upon both autonomy and informational privacy
interests protected by article I, section 1, the expectation of privacy of
the job applicants was reduced because they were already required to
undergo a preemployment medical exam, part of which included a
urinalysis for medical conditions.187 But because this urinalysis disclosed
additional private information regarding drug use, the employer was
required to justify it.188 The court cited “absenteeism, increased safety
concerns, tardiness, reduced productivity, and increased risk of turnover” as
potential problems of drug abusers that employers would justifiably want

182. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Cal. 1997) (plurality opinion).
183. Id. at 1230; see also Leonel v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 400 F.3d 702, 712 (9th Cir.
2005) (“To prove a claim under the California right to privacy, a plaintiff must first
demonstrate three elements: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances; and (3) conduct by the defendant that
amounts to a serious invasion of the protected privacy interest. These elements do not
constitute a categorical test, but rather serve as threshold components of a valid claim to
be used to ‘weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on a
constitutionally protected privacy interest as not even to require an explanation or
justification by the defendant.’ The defense should prevail on its motion for summary
judgment if it negates, as a matter of law, any one of these three threshold elements.”
(citations omitted)).
184. Loder, 927 P.2d at 1230 (plurality opinion).
185. Id. at 1221.
186. Id. at 1222.
187. Id. at 1232–33.
188. Id. at 1233.
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to know of before they hired any applicant.189 In balancing the “employer’s
substantial interest in conducting suspicionless drug testing of a job
applicant against the relatively minor intrusion upon such an applicant’s
reasonable expectations of privacy when the drug testing is conducted as
part of a general preemployment medical examination,” the court concluded
that the city’s drug-testing program did not violate article I, section 1.190
In Pioneer Electronics (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, the Supreme
Court of California reiterated the elements for a privacy claim under
article I, section 1.191 Relying on Hill, the court declared the claimant
“must possess a ‘legally protected privacy interest,’” emanating from
either informational or autonomy privacy.192 Second, the claimant must
enjoy a “reasonable expectation of privacy under the particular
circumstances.”193 Voluntary consent to a reduction in privacy should be
considered.194 Lastly, the “invasion of privacy . . . must be ‘serious’ in
nature, scope, and actual or potential impact to constitute an ‘egregious’
breach of social norms.”195 If the claimant met these criteria, the privacy
interest must then be balanced against the state’s competing interests.196
Recently, in Sheehan v. San Francisco 49ers, Ltd., the California
Supreme Court reaffirmed the elements of a privacy claim under article
I, section 1. Again, the court returned to the framework set forth in Hill
to clarify that, in a constitutional right to privacy action, a plaintiff must
establish “(1) a legally protected privacy interest, (2) a reasonable
expectation of privacy under the circumstances, and (3) a serious invasion
of the privacy interest.”197 In order to prevail in such an action, a defendant
may either negate any one of these three elements or may prove an
affirmative defense that the intrusion on privacy was warranted because
it advanced a countervailing interest.198 If the defendant presented an
affirmative defense, the plaintiff could respond by proving the availability

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
Pioneer Elecs. (USA), Inc. v. Superior Court, 150 P.3d 198, 204 (Cal. 2007).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 477 (Cal. 2009).
Id.
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of alternative measures that would be less invasive on one’s privacy
interest.199
As the plurality in Loder had declared twelve years earlier, the court in
Sheehan now stressed that the three elements constituting a claim under
article I, section 1 were merely threshold elements that courts may use to
weed out insignificant claims of privacy violations.200 Even if a plaintiff
establishes these elements, to determine whether a violation of article I,
section 1 has occurred, the court must still balance the need for the
conduct against the degree of the intrusion.201 Furthermore, the court
stressed that in determining the reasonableness of the policy, it is critical
for the court to consider whether it is a private or a government entity
that is acting.202 A government entity must provide stronger justification
for its intrusion on privacy interests because its power is pervasive and
coercive.203 Additionally, an individual has fewer alternatives when dealing
with the government than when interacting with a private entity.204
3. The Lower Courts’ View of Drug Testing
In a series of cases, the lower courts in California have examined
whether drug testing in various contexts violates the privacy provisions
of article I, section 1 of the California Constitution.205 Generally, the
courts have found that such testing does not violate the right to privacy.206
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. (“Hill was the first case in which our court addressed the question whether
the state constitutional privacy clause applies to private as well as to governmental
entities. Having concluded that the privacy clause applies to private entities and also that
the legal concept of ‘privacy’ potentially has a very broad sweep, the court in Hill determined
that it was appropriate to articulate several threshold elements that may permit courts to
weed out claims that involve so insignificant or de minimis an intrusion on a constitutionally
protected privacy interest as not even to require an explanation or justification by the
defendant. Hill cannot properly be read, however, to have adopted a sweeping new rule
under which a challenge to conduct that significantly affects a privacy interest protected
by the state Constitution may be rejected without any consideration of either the
legitimacy or strength of the defendant’s justification for the conduct.”).
202. Id. at 479.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 297, 298 (Ct. App.
1997).
206. See infra Part IV.B.3. In 1997, the California Attorney General addressed the
matter of drug testing of prosecutors. The Attorney General was asked whether, in the
absence of a preestablished policy, a county district attorney may order a deputy district
attorney to submit to a drug test. The Attorney General opined yes, as long as the test
was based on individualized suspicion. The Attorney General balanced the deputy’s
diminished expectation of privacy due to his employment in a “law enforcement” capacity
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In Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., the California Court of Appeal
reversed the lower court’s decision granting summary judgment.207 The
employer, Upper Deck, had instituted a suspicion-based drug-testing
program.208 Plaintiff Kraslawsky alleged there was no reasonable suspicion
to test her.209 The court of appeal concluded that there was a factual
dispute on that issue.210 If the plaintiff prevailed and established there
was no reasonable suspicion to test her, then the plaintiff could argue the
company’s drug test as applied to her violated her right to privacy under
article I, section 1.211
Although Upper Deck argued that Kraslawsky had no reasonable
expectation of privacy because she was not directly observed when
urinating, the court noted that even when no direct monitoring is
involved, a privacy claim may still be established.212 Moreover, just
because Kraslawsky had submitted to a preemployment drug test did not
mean that she surrendered her expectations of privacy while on the
job.213 Furthermore, when Upper Deck argued that Kraslawsky had
consented to the drug test, the court responded that consent is merely one
factor in the balancing test.214 It is not a complete defense.215 Finally,

against the government’s legitimate interest of maintaining the integrity of an office that
prosecutes drug cases. The Attorney General concluded that as long as there was reasonable
suspicion to justify the test, the testing did not violate the California Constitution. 80
Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 354 (1997), 1997 WL 789632.
207. Kraslawsky, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
208. Id. at 299.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 302.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 305. When a urinalysis test is “monitored by a nurse listening for
urination sounds outside the toilet area and employees [are] required to respond to a
written inquiry concerning their current medications,” the plaintiff’s privacy claim is not
eliminated. Id.
213. Id. at 306.
214. Id.
215. Id. In TBG Insurance Services Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Court
of Appeal noted that Hill implied that consent was a complete defense to a privacy claim,
but Kraslawsky viewed it only as one factor in the balancing test. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp.
v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 160–61 n.5 (Ct. App. 2002). This court noted
the distinction between consent in the drug-testing cases and the case before it. Id.
Consent in the drug-testing cases was particularly significant—when an individual is
asked to consent to drug testing, if she refuses, she loses her athletic, extracurricular, or
employment position. Id. When an employee is asked to consent to computer
monitoring, to avoid any invasion of privacy, she must use her employer’s computer
only for the stated purpose—business rather than personal. Id. Consequently, unlike a
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Kraslawsky’s assent to provide medical information to her employer
regarding requests for medical leave or for job-related injuries did not,
for the purposes of drug testing, lead to her complete surrender of privacy
rights.216 Consequently, she could proceed with a claim that this drug
test had violated her right to privacy.217
In Smith v. Fresno Irrigation District, the California Court of Appeal
reviewed whether the random drug testing of a state construction worker
violated the worker’s right to privacy under the California Constitution.218
The court balanced the intrusion into the employee’s privacy interest
against the need for the employer’s drug-testing program.219 Undoubtedly,
the collection and testing of the employee’s urine implicated his right to
privacy.220
With respect to his “autonomy privacy,” the employee was allowed to
visit a medical clinic to provide the urine sample.221 He was permitted
to provide the sample in a private manner and was not directly observed
providing the sample.222 Such indirect monitoring is considered minimally
intrusive.223
Regarding his “informational privacy,” the court recognized the
employee had a “privacy interest in precluding dissemination or misuse
of such sensitive and confidential information.”224 Nevertheless, the
employee’s privacy interest was reduced because he had been given six
months notice of the employer’s plan to implement this drug-testing
drug-testing case, the court viewed the employee’s consent in this computer-monitoring
case as a complete defense to his invasion of privacy claim. Id.
216. Kraslawsky, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 306. See also Bazargan v. Hilton Universal
City & Towers, in which the California Court of Appeal noted:
Thus, assuming there is a protected privacy interest, that interest must be analyzed
in the context of the circumstances, and other factors may affect a person’s
expectation of privacy. A ‘reasonable’ expectation of privacy is an objective
entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted community norms . . .
[T]he presence or absence of opportunities to consent voluntarily to activities
impacting privacy interests obviously affects the expectations of the participant.
Therefore, consideration of whether the plaintiff’s expectation of privacy in
any given situation is reasonable must take into account accepted community
norms, advance notice, and whether the plaintiff had any opportunity to consent to
or reject the circumstance constituting the invasion.
Bazargan v. Hilton Universal City & Towers, No. B186942, 2007 WL 103074, at *7
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2007) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
217. Kraslawsky, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 307.
218. Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 778 (Ct. App. 1999).
219. Id. at 785.
220. Id. at 784.
221. Id. at 785.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
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program.225 Advance notice reduces the element of surprise inherent in
random drug testing.226 The randomness of the program effectively deters
substance abuse on the job and eliminates the opportunity for targeted
harassment.227
On the other hand, the employer adopted this policy to address safety
concerns on the job.228 The court agreed that the employer had a legitimate
interest in protecting the plaintiff’s coworkers from the severe and
immediate harm a drug-abusing worker could pose.229
Balancing the district’s interest in reducing the risk of harm to its
employees against the employee’s interest in privacy, the court concluded
that the district’s interest was greater than the employee’s interests.230
Consequently, the court found no violation of article I, section 1.231
California appellate courts have also examined whether a drug-testing
condition on a term of probation imposed on a juvenile offender violated
the juvenile’s right to privacy.232 In In re Kacy S., the court conflated its
analysis under article I, sections 1 and 13, and found no violation of either
right.233 To determine whether the drug-testing condition violated the
defendant’s right to privacy and the right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures, the court simply balanced the probationer’s
expectation of privacy against the government’s interest in monitoring
the activities of the juvenile probationer.234 Although the court found
the drug testing invaded the minor’s privacy, it determined that the
minor’s privacy interest was diminished because he was on probation
225. Id. In TBG Insurance Services Corp. v. Superior Court, the California Court
of Appeal also found that the company’s advance notice to the employee gave the
employee sufficient notice to accept or reject the new policy. The advance notice and written
consent defeated his reasonable expectation of privacy because he knew that the
company would monitor his computer, and he could have prevented any intrusion on his
privacy by simply using the computer for its intended purpose—company business. TBG
Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 161–63 & n.5 (Ct. App.
2002).
226. Smith, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 785.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 787–88.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 788.
232. People v. Daniel A. (In re Daniel A.), No. A102372, 2004 WL 245579, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004); People v. Kacy S. (In re Kacy S.), 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 432,
434 (Ct. App. 1998).
233. Kacy S., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 436–37.
234. Id.
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and already subject to the rules and regulations of that condition.235 On
the other hand, the government had a strong interest in rehabilitating the
minor and protecting the public.236 When balancing the two interests,
the court found the government’s interest outweighed those of the
probationer.237 Consequently, it found no violation of either constitutional
right.238
In In re Carmen M. v. Superior Court, the California Court of Appeal
examined whether the court-ordered drug testing of a “dependent” child
violated the child’s right to privacy under article I, section 1.239 The
court concluded that it did not.240
Due to serious problems in the home and past drug use, sixteen-yearold Carmen M. was removed from her mother’s custody and placed in a
group home.241 While at the group home, Carmen M. responded well to
drug treatment, including random drug testing.242 After six months in
the group home, Carmen M. refused to return to her mother’s residence
and asked to stay in the group home.243 The Department of Children and
Family Services sought a court order, finding Carmen M. a dependent
child of the court.244 Ultimately, the court sustained the petition and
ordered Carmen M. to continue living at the group home.245 While at the
facility, she was to undergo drug testing if the staff suspected she was
using drugs.246 Counsel for Carmen M. objected to the drug-testing
provision, arguing that the drug-testing condition violated her right to
privacy under article I, section 1.247
The Court of Appeal disagreed.248 The court noted:

235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. In Daniel A., the court agreed with the holding in Kacy S. People v. Daniel
A. (In re Daniel A.), No. A102372, 2004 WL 245579 at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2004)
(“Although urine testing constitutes an intrusion on privacy, the effect of the intrusion is
outweighed by the government’s legitimate interest in closely monitoring the rehabilitation of
minors who are granted probation and returned to the custody of their parents.”).
239. Carmen M. v. Superior Court (In re Carmen M.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 117, 119
(Ct. App. 2006).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 119–120.
245. Id. at 120.
246. Id. at 121.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 129.
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Where the case involves an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal
autonomy, e.g., freedom from involuntary sterilization or the freedom to pursue
consensual familial relationships, a “compelling interest” must be present to
overcome the vital privacy interest. If, in contrast, the privacy interest is less central
or in bona fide dispute, general balancing tests are employed. With respect to
the privacy interest implicated by the drug-testing program at issue in Hill, the
Supreme Court determined that a general balancing test, rather than a compelling
interest test, was applicable.249

Generally, the court weighs the need for the intrusion on privacy
against the depth of the intrusion.250 The context in which the alleged
invasion of privacy occurs is critical to this analysis.251 Here, Carmen
M.’s status as a minor and as a dependent child diminished her right to
privacy.252 Due to Carmen M.’s status as a dependent child, the court
was acting in the role of the parent.253 As such, the court acted to protect
her health and welfare.254 Moreover, Carmen M. had used drugs in the
past but now was doing well with drug counseling and testing.255
Consequently, the need to drug test Carmen M. was significant.256 The
intrusion on her privacy was minimal due to her status as a dependent
minor.257 Furthermore, the court had ordered that Carmen M. be tested
only if the group home staff suspected that Carmen M. was using
drugs.258 Thus, the testing was not random but was based on reasonable
suspicion.259 In view of the court’s valid concern about Carmen M.’s
well-being and the fact that the testing was grounded on suspicion, the
court found that this limited intrusion on Carmen M.’s right to privacy
was justified.260

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

Id. at 126 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
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4. Drug Testing of California Students
To determine whether student drug testing violates the right to privacy
under article I, section 1 of the California Constitution,261 it is necessary
to analyze the issue under the criteria first set forth in Hill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass’n262 and most recently reiterated in Sheehan v.
San Francisco 49ers, Ltd.263
a. Legally Protected Interest
Just as in Hill, a policy to drug test middle and high school student
athletes and those engaged in extracurricular activities affects the students’
legally protected privacy interest.264 A drug-testing program implicates
both informational and autonomy interests.265 Unlike Hill, school officials
generally are not testing for performance-enhancing drugs such as steroids;
261. On May 6, 2009, during the writing of this Article, Superior Court Judge
Monica Marlow ruled on the ACLU’s motion for preliminary injunction in the matter of
Brown v. Shasta Union High School District. Brown v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist.,
No. 164933 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 7, 2009), appeal docketed, No. C061972 (Cal. Ct. App.
May 27, 2009). In granting the preliminary injunction, enjoining the school district from
enforcing its drug-testing policy as to students engaged in extracurricular and cocurricular
activities, Judge Marlow found that the plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of
their case and that they would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction was not granted.
Id. at 4. As to the right to privacy arguments under article I, section 1, Judge Marlow
ruled that the students had a reasonable expectation of privacy because the students were
indirectly monitored while urinating, their urine was analyzed, and the test results were
provided to school officials. Id. The intrusion on privacy of the students engaged in
extracurricular or cocurricular activities was significant because, unlike student athletes,
the physical condition of these students was not regularly scrutinized. Id. at 5.
Furthermore, there was insufficient notice of the program and the consent to be tested
was unclear. Lastly, the targeted activities included those that students were required to
pursue, either to satisfy academic requirements at the high school or to meet university entrance
prerequisites. Id. at 5. On the other hand, the school district could not establish a
compelling interest for testing the students engaged in these extracurricular and
cocurricular activities. Id. The courts found no evidence that students in these activities
were using drugs to enhance their performance or were more likely to be abusing drugs
for recreational purposes. Id. at 5–6. With respect to the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures under article I, section 13, Judge Marlow found that
the minimum requirement for searching a student is reasonable suspicion. Id. at 8.
Because this drug-testing program was not based on reasonable suspicion, the court also
found that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on the merits of this claim. Id. The California
Court of Appeal for the Third District affirmed this decision on September 2, 2010.
Brown v. Shasta Union High Sch. Dist., No. CO61972, 2010 WL 3442147 (Cal. Ct.
App. Sept. 2, 2010).
262. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994).
263. Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472 (Cal. 2009); see also Hernandez v.
Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063 (Cal. 2009).
264. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 654.
265. See supra notes 144–45and accompanying text.
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they are testing for the use of illicit substances such as marijuana,
cocaine, and amphetamines.266 Also unlike Hill, the primary purpose of
the testing is to prevent and deter drug use, not to protect the integrity of
the activity.267
The student’s interest in autonomy privacy is affected if there is direct
monitoring of the student’s urination.268 If there is only indirect monitoring
of the urination—by accompanying the student to the restroom or
waiting outside the stall and listening to urination noises—the student’s
privacy interest, albeit a lesser one, is still implicated.269 If a student
must disclose the medications he takes and the reasons for taking those
medications before testing, his informational privacy interest is also
impacted.270 Moreover, the collection and analysis of the urine sample
further implicates the student’s privacy interests.271 The student also has
a privacy interest in maintaining the confidentiality of this sensitive
information.272
b. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy, the court examines the context of the activity. To evaluate the
reasonableness of the expectation of privacy, the court considers the
“customs, practices, and physical settings surrounding particular activities,”
as well as the opportunity to be notified in advance and to consent to the
intrusion.273
Students have a reasonable expectation of privacy, but this expectation
is reduced because they are in the custody and control of the school.274
They must follow the rules and regulations of the administration, which
often limit their privacy.275 The United States Supreme Court has found

266. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 826 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995).
267. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661–62 (1995).
268. Hill, 865 P.2d at 657.
269. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
270. Hill, 865 P.2d at 657–58.
271. Id.
272. Smith v. Fresno Irrigation Dist., 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 775, 785 (Ct. App. 1999).
273. Hill, 865 P.2d at 655.
274. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829–30 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656–57 (1995).
275. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
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that students engaged in athletics and extracurricular activities have a
lesser expectation of privacy than ordinary students because they must
abide by the special rules of those activities.276
The student athlete has an even lower expectation of privacy than the
ordinary student because the student athlete’s activities are highly regulated.
Further, athletes share locker rooms where they shower and change
clothes together.277 Before they participate in sports, student athletes
must also undergo physical exams and share medical information with
their coaches.278 These actions diminish their privacy interests.279
On the other hand, students engaged in extracurricular activities, such
as the choir or chess club, are not required to undergo this level of
physical scrutiny and share this level of intimacy with other students.280
Unlike Loder, in which the employers were already requiring job applicants
to undergo a full medical exam and urinalysis,281 students involved in
extracurricular activities are not required to undergo such exams.282 As
a result, the invasion of their privacy is greater than that of a student
athlete.283
Student athletes usually have to undergo physical examinations to
participate in sports.284 Even if they have to submit to a medical urinalysis
to clear them for competition, Loder held that a urinalysis that tests for
illicit substances is a further invasion of the person’s expectation of
privacy.285 Moreover, what permitted the drug testing in Hill―the concern
for the integrity of the sport due to the abuse of performance-enhancing
drugs286―is absent in these student drug-testing cases. Here, unlike Hill,
the schools are not testing student athletes for harmful performanceenhancing drugs and, as an afterthought, also testing them for illegal

276. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831–32; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657. Despite the High
Court’s ruling, it is still difficult to understand how the privacy of members of the chess
club or the school choir is diminished because they are required to attend regular
meetings or travel to interschool competitions.
277. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Earls, 536 U.S. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch.
Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 84 (Pa. 2003); Christopher A. Gorman, Public School Students’
Fourth Amendment Rights After Vernonia and Earls: Why Limits Must Be Set on
Suspicionless Drug Screening in the Public Schools, 29 VT. L. REV. 147, 162–63 (2004).
281. See supra text accompanying notes 182–90.
282. Theodore, 836 A.2d at 84; Gorman, supra note 280, at 162–63.
283. Gorman, supra note 280, at 162–63.
284. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656.
285. Loder v. City of Glendale, 927 P.2d 1200, 1233 (Cal. 1997); see also
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656–57.
286. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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substances; the schools are primarily testing these student athletes for
illegal substances simply to deter substance abuse.287 Unlike Hill and
Loder, the invasion of privacy is not undertaken for a proven purpose
such as protecting the integrity of sport288 or preventing absenteeism or
reduced productivity;289 rather, it is being undertaken for the unproven
purpose of deterring substance abuse.290
In determining the student’s expectation of privacy, the court considers
whether the student has had advance notice of the drug-testing program.
Notice reduces the element of surprise and allows the student to mentally
prepare for the fact that he may be drug tested at some point during his
participation in athletics or extracurricular activities.291 The student’s
expectation of privacy is diminished, as opposed to someone who is never
forewarned that a drug test will be conducted in the future. Nonetheless,
it is still jarring for the student to be publicly removed from the classroom
by a teacher or a coach, accompanied to the restroom by a chaperone, and
monitored, either directly or indirectly, while urinating in order to be
drug tested on demand. This certainly differs from being asked to visit a
medical clinic at one’s own convenience, provide a urine sample, and await
the results from the doctor.292 Furthermore, if the student “fails” the
drug test, the result of that test becomes publicly known when, due to his
suspension, the “failing” student suddenly becomes consistently absent
from the activity.293
Additionally, the court considers a student’s voluntary consent to the
program.294 The validity of the consent will be determined by the totality
of the circumstances.295 Initially, it is important to note that students
who attend public school and who participate in school athletics or
extracurricular activities may have few other alternatives.296 Minors in

287. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837–38 (2002); Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 661.
288. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837–38; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661
289. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
290. See infra text accompanying notes 325–29.
291. See supra text accompanying note 150.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 221–23.
293. Michael T. Neaderbaomer, Comment, Drug Testing Students in Public Schools: A
New Lesson in the Unwarranted Expansion of the “Special Needs Balancing Test,” 25 J.
JUV. L. 56, 60 (2005).
294. Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 478 (Cal. 2009).
295. Id.
296. See id. at 479.
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California between the age of six and eighteen are required to attend
school full time.297 They may not be able to afford private schools.
Students may consent to testing because they recognize that if they
refuse to consent, they will forego their opportunity to participate in an
essential component of public education—extracurricular activities.298
For some students, this could result in a lost opportunity to attend
college299 or an inability to earn a scholarship or some other form of
financial aid.300 For others, it may mean a loss of valuable vocational
skills.301 Faced with this dilemma, a student may feel obliged to consent.302
Thus, the voluntariness of this consent is highly problematic.303
Moreover, unlike Hill, in which the California Supreme Court found
that participating in college sports is not a “government benefit or an
economic necessity that society has decreed must be open to all,”304
attending public school and engaging in free extracurricular activities are
rights protected by the California Constitution.305 The government,
therefore, should not be permitted to condition a student’s constitutional
right to participate in extracurricular activities on the student’s consent
to surrender his right to privacy.306
c. Seriousness of the Invasion
The court determines the seriousness of the invasion of the students’
privacy interests by the details of the collection process: where it was
done, who conducted the test, and whether the program involved direct
or indirect monitoring.307 Direct monitoring is considered a more serious
invasion than indirect monitoring.308 Additionally, the court reviews to
297. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48200 (West 2006).
298. See Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 42–43 (Cal. 1984).
299. Gorman, supra note 280, at 164–65; Nicholas A. Palumbo, Comment, Protecting
Access to Extracurricular Activities: The Need To Recognize a Fundamental Right to a
Minimally Adequate Education, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 393, 415.
300. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 845–46 (2002) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting);
Neaderbaomer, supra note 293, at 59.
301. Gorman, supra note 280, at 164–65; Palumbo, supra note 299, at 415–16.
302. Gorman, supra note 280, at 165–66.
303. Id.; Neaderbaomer, supra note 293, at 62.
304. Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal. 1994).
305. Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 44 (Cal. 1984).
306. Hill, 865 P.2d at 659; Gorman, supra note 280, at 165–66. The doctrine of
unconstitutional conditions prescribes that the Government may not condition the
exercise of one constitutional right on the surrender or nonassertion of another
constitutional right. See, e.g., Robbins v. Superior Court, 695 P.2d 695, 704 n.20 (Cal.
1985); Daniels v. McMahon, 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 404, 410 (Ct. App. 1992).
307. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 153–55.
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whom the results of the urinalysis were divulged and the reasons for taking
the prescribed drugs.309 Moreover, the consequences of testing positive
are critical. If the results were merely disclosed to a teacher, a coach, or
the student and his parents, the court would likely view the invasion of
privacy as a minor invasion.310 If the results were divulged to law
enforcement or if the results affected a student’s academic standing, the
seriousness of the invasion would be considered substantial.311
If the student can make this threshold showing, then the court balances
the student’s interest in privacy against the school district’s interest in
conducting the drug-testing program.312 The student does have an
interest in privacy here, but it is diminished because the student operates
under the school’s rules and regulations.313 A student athlete should
expect less privacy than an ordinary student.314 A student engaged in
extracurricular activities has been found to have a lesser expectation of
privacy than the ordinary student but a greater expectation of privacy
than a student athlete.315
d. Invasion Is Justified Because It Serves a Legitimate
Competing or Countervailing Interest
To justify the invasion of privacy, the school district must establish
that it is promoting a legitimate competing or countervailing interest.316
No compelling interest needs to be shown.317 Such a defense is limited
to instances in which “obvious government action impacting freedom of
309. See supra text accompanying notes 156–57.
310. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (stating that “the results of the tests are disclosed only
to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to know”).
311. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (stating that the test
results “are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal disciplinary
function”).
312. See Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201 P.3d 472, 477 (Cal. 2009); see also supra
text accompanying notes 197–99.
313. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (“[S]tudents within the school environment have a
lesser expectation of privacy than members of the population generally.”).
314. Id.
315. Earls, 536 U.S. at 846 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch.
Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 93 (Pa. 2003). (“Interscholastic athletes similarly require close safety
and health regulation; a school’s choir, band and academic team do not.”).
316. See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 659 (Cal. 1994).
317. Hernandez v. Hillsides, Inc., 211 P.3d 1063, 1073 (Cal. 2009); Hill, 865 P.2d
at 654.
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expression and association” or an “obvious invasion of an interest
fundamental to personal autonomy” is involved.318
Initially, the school district must show its schools suffer from a drug
problem.319 If the district is successful in establishing this element, it
must show it is instituting the drug policy to prevent harm to those
participating in these activities and to deter drug use by those tested and
by the rest of the student body. 320 Student athletes are particularly
susceptible to injury if they are abusing drugs. 321 Additionally, the
student athletes serve as role models for other students.322 If they are
sober, presumably this will serve to deter drug use among the rest of the
student population. The case is harder to make with students engaged in
extracurricular activities. There is little evidence that students engaged
in extracurricular or cocurricular activities abuse drugs.323 Furthermore,
these students are not more susceptible to injuries due to their alleged
drug use.324 For these reasons, the court may find drug testing students
involved in extracurricular and cocurricular activities does not serve a
legitimate interest.
The additional weakness in the justification argument is the lack of
research establishing that drug testing serves to deter student drug use.325

318. Hill, 865 P.2d at 653.
319. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 834; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 662–63; Theodore, 836 A.2d
at 93. “The program in Joye, like the program in Vernonia, was adopted in response to a
documented drug problem within the high school.” Id. “[T]he suspicionless search
policy at issue has not been supported by sufficient proof that there is an actual drug
problem in the Delaware Valley School District; [or] by individualized proof that the
targeted students are at all likely to be part of whatever drug problem may (or may not)
exist . . . .” Id. at 96; see also Kari L. Higbee, Comment, Student Privacy Rights: Drug
Testing and Fourth Amendment Protections, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 361, 400–01 (2005).
320. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 663.
321. Id. at 662 (“Finally, it must not be lost sight of that this program is directed
more narrowly to drug use by school athletes, where the risk of immediate physical harm
to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his sport is particularly high.”).
322. Id. at 663.
323. Earls, 536 U.S. at 853 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gorman, supra note 280, at
173–74.
324. Earls, 536 U.S. at 852 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Theodore, 836 A.2d at 92
(“Students in the band, chess club, drama club, or academic clubs simply do not pose the
same sort of danger to themselves or others . . . .”).
325. See, e.g., Einesman & Taras, supra note 19, at 264–66. The Department of
Education’s Office of Safe and Drug Free Schools is currently undertaking an evaluation
of its mandatory random student drug-testing program. See NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC.
EVALUATION & REG’L ASSISTANCE, An Evaluation of the Impact of Mandatory Random
Student Drug Testing, http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/projects/evaluation/other_drugtesting.asp
(last visited Aug. 12, 2010). The evaluation began in September 2006 and will continue
until August 2010. Id. The final report will be announced on http://ies.ed.gov/ncee. Id.
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No scientific study confirms that student drug testing deters drug use.326
In fact, most recent studies show that drug testing has little to no deterrent
effect.327 Additionally, other commentators have voiced concern that
drug testing may actually harm students.328 The American Academy of
Pediatrics recommends that school-based “drug testing not be implemented
before its safety and efficacy are established.”329
Consequently, when the court balances the student’s privacy interest
against the school’s need for the program, the student’s privacy interest
should prevail. This is particularly true with respect to students engaged
in extracurricular and cocurricular activities whose privacy interests may
only be slightly less than those of the general student population. Their
privacy interests should outweigh the need for a school district’s drugtesting policy when no significant drug problem has been shown to exist
and when there is no evidence that drug testing serves its stated
purpose—deterring drug use. These students’ right to privacy under
article I, section 1 would be violated by a drug-testing policy in a district

326. See Comm. on Substance Abuse & Council on Sch. Health, Testing for Drugs
of Abuse in Children and Adolescents: Addendum—Testing in Schools and at Home, 119
PEDIATRICS 627, 628 (2007) (“Currently, there is little evidence of the effectiveness of
school-based drug testing in the scientific literature.”); Cynthia Kelly Conlon, Urineschool: A
Study of the Impact of the Earls Decision on High School Random Drug Testing Policies,
32 J. L. & EDUC. 297, 319 (2003) (“The most significant finding of all, however, may be
that principals are making policy in the absence of data to show that random drug testing
actually deters student drug use. Although intuition may suggest that testing will be a
deterrent, little research has been conducted to find out if this is so.”); McKim, supra
note 111 (“‘There is no compelling and convincing research that we know of to show
that drug testing is effective,’ said [Greg] Wolfe, of the Safe and Healthy Kids Program
Office.”).
327. Linn Goldberg et al., Outcomes of a Prospective Trial of Student-Athlete Drug
Testing: The Student Athlete Testing Using Random Notification (SATURN) Study, 41 J.
ADOLESCENT HEALTH 421, 426 (2007); see also Robert Taylor, Compensating Behavior
and the Drug Testing of High School Athletes, 16 CATO J. 351, 356–63 (1997); Ryoko
Yamaguchi et al., Relationship Between Student Illicit Drug Use and School DrugTesting Policies, 73 J. SCH. HEALTH 159, 159–64 (2003); William C. Rhoden, Plan B
Needed To Deter Young Athletes from Drug Use, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at D5. But
see What Works Clearinghouse, U.S. Dep’t of Educ., WWC Quick Review of the Article
“Outcomes of a Prospective Trial of Student-Athlete Drug Testing: The Student Athlete
Testing Using Random Notification (SATURN) Study,” INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION
SCIENCES (May 2008), http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/PDF/quickreviews/saturn_050608.pdf
(criticizing the SATURN study because it “experienced high rates of sample attrition”
and the “control students were different at baseline”).
328. Einesman & Taras, supra note 19, at 266–70.
329. Comm. on Substance Abuse & Council on Sch. Health, supra note 326, at 629.
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where no demonstrated drug problem exists and where no effective
drug-testing program could be shown.
5. Article I, Section 13: Right To Be Free from Unreasonable
Searches and Seizures
Article I, section 13 of the California Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable seizures and searches may not be violated; and a warrant
may not issue except on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be
seized.330

The California Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that “the
California Constitution ‘is, and always has been, a document of independent
force.’”331 Moreover, “the rights embodied in and protected by the state
Constitution are not invariably identical to the rights contained in the
federal Constitution.”332
Furthermore, another provision of the California Constitution―article
I, section 24―provides that “[r]ights guaranteed by [the California]
Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the United States
Constitution.”333 This provision was adopted by the people of California
during the November 1974 election to reaffirm existing law that state
constitutional guarantees were independent of those found in the Federal
Constitution.334 Consequently, “even when the terms of the California
Constitution are textually identical to those of the federal Constitution,
the proper interpretation of the state constitutional provision is not
invariably identical to the federal courts’ interpretation of the corresponding
provision contained in the federal Constitution.”335
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court has acknowledged a general
policy that state courts should defer to the United States Supreme Court
in interpreting similar constitutional language in state and federal
constitutions.336 The California Supreme Court has recognized that this
policy is not absolute; it would not apply for “cogent reasons,” “independent

330. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
331. Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997) (quoting
People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13).
332. Id.
333. CAL. CONST. art I, § 24.
334. Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1114.
335. Lungren, 940 P.2d at 808.
336. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990).
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state interests,” or “strong countervailing circumstances.”337 Furthermore,
the California Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that it is “a court of
last resort [in interpreting state constitutional guaranties]”338 and that
with the adoption of article I, section 24 “California courts had the
authority to adopt an independent interpretation of the state Constitution.”339
As a result, despite virtually identical language to that of the Fourth
Amendment, article I, section 13 may,340 and has, provided greater
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than its federal
counterpart.341 For example, in People v. Brisendine, the California
Supreme Court found that article I, section 13 “impose[s] a higher standard
of reasonableness” than that required by the Fourth Amendment.342 In
People v. Norman, the court reaffirmed the “state’s power to impose a
higher constitutional standard for searches and seizures based upon the
California Constitution.”343
In the California primary election of June 1982, the electorate voted
for Proposition 8, thereby adding section 28(d) to article I of the
California Constitution.344 This section provides, inter alia: “Except as
provided by statute hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the
membership in each house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not
be excluded in any criminal proceeding . . . .”345 Immediately after

337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. In Cooper v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that each state
had “power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the
Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so. And when such state standards alone have
been violated, the State is free, without review by us, to apply its own state harmless-error
rule to such errors of state law.” Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
341. People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110 (Cal. 1975) (“[O]ur holding today
is based exclusively on article I, section 13, of the California Constitution, which requires a
more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.”), superseded by constitutional
amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; People v. Norman, 538 P.2d 237, 244–45 (Cal.
1975), superseded by constitutional amendment, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 13; see also People v.
Mayoff, 729 P.2d 166, 171 (Cal. 1986) (“On many occasions, we have concluded that
the California Constitution accords greater protection to individual rights within our
borders than federal law guarantees throughout the nation.”).
342. Brisendine, 531 P.2d at 1115.
343. Norman, 538 P.2d at 244.
344. People v. Lance W. (In re Lance W.), 694 P.2d 744, 747 (Cal. 1985); Grover
C. Trask II & Timothy J. Searight, Proposition 8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a
New Balance of Defendant and Victim Rights, 23 PAC. L.J. 1101, 1102 (1992).
345. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d).
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adoption of this constitutional amendment, its scope was unclear. The
California Supreme Court, nonetheless, quickly declared that “Proposition 8
did not repeal either section 13 or section 24 of article I. The substantive
scope of both provisions remains unaffected by Proposition 8.”346
What the proposition did do was eliminate the judicially created
remedy of exclusion of evidence in a criminal case for a violation of the
search and seizure provision of the Federal Constitution or state
constitution, except as required by federal law.347 Consequently, the
California Supreme Court held that article I, section 28(d) repealed the
California vicarious exclusionary rule and eliminated a defendant’s right
to suppress evidence that met Fourth Amendment standards but violated
article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.348
Although the remedy of exclusion of evidence in a criminal case for a
violation of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution would
now be determined by federal law, the substantive scope of article I,
section 13 remained the same. It still could provide greater protection to
the citizens of California than its Fourth Amendment counterpart. In a
criminal context, however, this would be irrelevant because the remedy
for a violation of article 1, section 13 would be determined by federal
law. In a civil context, however, when the remedy is not exclusion of
evidence, but an injunction,349 declaratory relief,350 or monetary damages,351
Proposition 8 is inapplicable.
Such is the case with drug testing of students. Those drug-testing
programs that are awarded federal funds by the Department of Education
346. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 752 (“What would have been an unlawful search or
seizure in this state before the passage of that initiative would be unlawful today, and this
is so even if it would pass muster under the federal Constitution.”); see also People v.
McKay, 41 P.3d 59, 71 (Cal. 2002) (“Proposition 8 left intact the substantive scope of
state statutory and constitutional rights against arrest for minor offenses.”).
347. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 752; see also McKay, 41 P.3d at 62–63 (“What
Proposition 8 does is to eliminate a judicially created remedy for violations of the search
and seizure provisions of the federal or state Constitutions, through the exclusion of
evidence so obtained, except to the extent that exclusion remains federally compelled.”);
People v. Camacho, 3 P.3d 878, 882 (Cal. 2000) (“Our state Constitution thus forbids the
courts to order the exclusion of evidence at trial as a remedy for an unreasonable search
and seizure unless that remedy is required by the federal Constitution as interpreted by
the United States Supreme Court.”).
348. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 759.
349. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 526(3) (West 2006).
350. See, e.g., County of Butte v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 421, 426–29 (Ct.
App. 2009).
351. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 52.1(b) (West 2006). For a discussion of remedies
available under section 52.1, see Barry Litt & Genie Harrison, Rights for Wrongs: Recent
Clarifications Have Expanded the Reach and Remedies Available Under the Tom Bane
Civil Rights Act, L.A. LAW., Dec. 2005, at 27, 28.

720

EINSEMAN FINAL PAGES (DO NOT DELETE)

[VOL. 47: 681, 2010]

9/13/2010 10:38 AM

Drug Testing Students in California
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

are allocated grants only if the programs are part of a larger drugprevention program that provides treatment or counseling to students
who are found to be using drugs.352 The programs receive funding on
the condition that the testing results will be kept confidential and that the
projects are consistent with “constitutional principles.”353 The United
States Supreme Court specifically found the drug-testing program in
Earls constitutional because the test results were not submitted to law
enforcement and did not lead to any student discipline by the
school.354 Consequently, Proposition 8 has no relevance to student drugtesting challenges under article I, section 13.
a. Reasonableness Under Article I, Section 13
1. School Searches
There is no question that public school officials are government agents
whose actions are covered by article I, section 13 of the California
Constitution.355 Moreover, drug testing constitutes a search for purposes
of article I, section 13.356 The salient issue is what standard should apply
under article I, section 13 to determine the reasonableness of a drug-test
search conducted by public school officials upon students.357
The Supreme Court of California has recognized the special environment
of schools and found that the appropriate standard of reasonableness for
searches in schools is reasonable suspicion.358 The court recognized that
both the privacy of the individual student as well as the security of the
entire student body must be protected.359 The court noted that a student
has the “highest privacy interests in his or her own person, belongings, and
physical enclaves, such as lockers.”360 To protect the competing interests,
352. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 5.
353. Id.
354. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002).
355. People v. William G. (In re William G.), 709 P.2d 1287, 1293 (Cal. 1985).
356. People v. Melton, 750 P.2d 741, 754 n.7 (Cal. 1988); see also Luck v. S. Pac.
Trans. Co., 267 Cal. Rptr. 618, 625–27 (Ct. App. 1990).
357. “Because the California Constitution is a document of independent force, the
rights it guarantees are not necessarily coextensive with those protected by the federal
Constitution.” E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Corp. v. State, 13 P.3d 1122, 1138 (Cal. 2000)
(citing Am. Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 940 P.2d 797, 808 (Cal. 1997)).
358. William G., 709 P.2d at 1294.
359. Id. at 1294–95.
360. Id. at 1295.
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the court was required to weigh the privacy interests of the individual
student against the governmental interest in maintaining a safe learning
environment.361 To accomplish this balance, the court concluded that
“searches of students by public school officials must be based on a
reasonable suspicion that the student or students to be searched have
engaged, or are engaging, in a proscribed activity (that is, a violation of a
school rule or regulation, or a criminal statute).”362 The search must be
“justified at its inception,” and the scope of the search has to be
“reasonably related” to its initial purpose.363 Consequently, the court ruled
that a school official’s suspicionless search of a student’s computer case
violated article I, section 13, and all evidence derived from the search
was suppressed.364
Relying on this precedent, the lower courts have repeatedly upheld the
requirement of reasonable suspicion for searches of students on campus.
In In re Alexander B., the California Court of Appeal found that a cursory
search of a group of students for weapons was reasonable because it was
based on reasonable suspicion―information provided by a student to the
dean that someone in the group possessed weapons.365 In In re Cody S.,
the California Court of Appeal declared that in order to search a high
school student’s locker and backpack, the campus security officer was
required to have individualized suspicion that the student was breaking
either an academic regulation or a criminal law.366 In re Lisa G. reaffirmed
this principle, finding that a teacher’s search of a student’s purse was
unreasonable because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion.367
The search was invalid because the teacher had no suspicion that the
student had contraband in her purse.368

361. Id. at 1294.
362. Id. at 1295.
363. Id. at 1296.
364. Id. at 1297–98; see also People v. William V. (In re William V.), 4 Cal. Rptr.
3d 695, 698–700 (Ct. App. 2003) (finding that even if a police officer assigned to the
school as a resource officer conducted the search, the standard required to support the student
search is reasonable suspicion and not probable cause).
365. People v. Alexander B. (In re Alexander B.), 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (Ct. App.
1990), overruled in part by In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 246 (Cal. 2001).
366. People v. Cody S. (In re Cody S.), 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 655–56 (Ct. App.
2004).
367. People v. Lisa G. (In re Lisa G.), 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 163, 166–67 (Ct. App.
2004).
368. Id. at 166. In 2000, the California Attorney General opined that public school
officials could not conduct random, suspicionless canine sniffs on students’
personal belongings outside the presence of the students. The Attorney General concluded
that the Federal and California Constitutions required individualized suspicion if a
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Some lower courts have refined this standard when safety of the entire
student community is at issue. Recognizing that article I, section 28(c)
of the California Constitution provides that public school students and
staff have “the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe,
secure and peaceful,”369 the courts have allowed random, suspicionless
searches when a potential threat to the entire student body exists and
there is no alternative means to confront that threat.370
Consequently, the court has permitted random metal detector weapon
searches of students because the “special needs” of the school required
it.371 By balancing the strong interests of the school to maintain the
safety of the campus against the minimal intrusion of the privacy of the
student, the court found the search to be reasonable.372 Moreover, the
court concluded that requiring reasonable suspicion was unworkable in
this situation.373 Short of waiting for the student to display the weapon
at school, there was no way to determine if a particular student was
hiding a weapon under his clothes and bringing it on to campus.374
The court has also permitted a suspicionless pat-down search of a
minor who was not a student at the school.375 Citing article I, section
28(c), concern for campus safety, and the fact that the minor was not
even a student at the school, the court balanced the interests.376 It found
that the school’s significant interest in protecting the security of the
campus outweighed the outsider’s privacy interest, which was less than
that of a student who was authorized to be on campus.377

school sought to separate students from their belongings in order to have a drug detection dog
sniff the items. 83 Ops. Cal. Att’y Gen. 257, 257, 262 (2000), 2000 WL 1729574.
369. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
370. See, e.g., People v. Latasha W. (In re Latasha W.), 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 887
(Ct. App. 1998).
371. Id.
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. People v. Jose Y. (In re Jose Y.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 270–71 (Ct. App.
2006).
376. Id.
377. Id.
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2. School Seizures
The California Supreme Court has distinguished seizures from searches,
and it has found reasonable suspicion was not required to support the
reasonableness of a seizure in a school.378 Recognizing the “special
needs” of preserving order in the schools, the court decided that when a
school official briefly detains a student to question him outside the
classroom, reasonable suspicion is not required.379 The seizure is valid
as long as it is “not arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of
harassment.”380 Distinguishing a seizure from a search, the court
recognized that “[d]ifferent interests are implicated by a search than by a
seizure, and a seizure is ‘generally less intrusive’ than a search.”381
Consequently, a ten-minute detention and questioning of a student outside a
classroom by a school security official did not require individualized
suspicion as long as it was not arbitrary or harassing.382 In the case
before the court, it was neither, and therefore, it was not an unconstitutional
seizure.383
The lower courts have also held that when detaining a minor who was
not a student at the school but who was present on school grounds,
reasonable suspicion is not required.384 To maintain the security of the
campus, the school official acted reasonably in briefly detaining the
outsider to ascertain his identity and purpose for being on school
grounds.385
3. Searching Students by Drug Testing
Schools in California are testing middle and high school students engaged
in athletics, extracurricular activities, and cocurricular activities.386 The
question is whether this drug testing is reasonable under article I, section
13 of the California Constitution.387
378. People v. Randy G. (In re Randy G.), 28 P.3d 239, 246 (Cal. 2001).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. (citations omitted).
382. Id.
383. Id. at 247.
384. People v. Joseph F. (In re Joseph F.), 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 641, 649 (Ct. App.
2000).
385. Id. at 651.
386. See supra text accompanying notes 103–10 on grants to California schools for
student drug testing.
387. A recent decision of the California Supreme Court may help to answer this
question. In In re Jaime P., the court overruled In re Tyrell, ruling that a juvenile’s
probationary search condition did not justify a suspicionless search of the juvenile
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Under the Federal Constitution, the United States Supreme Court has
examined drug testing of student athletes and students engaged in
extracurricular activities.388 In each case, it has adopted the special
needs test and found that under the circumstances special needs exist.389
Consequently, the United States Supreme Court has balanced the interests
and found that the two drug-testing programs are reasonable.390
In California, the results may differ. Article I, section 13 has provided
greater substantive protection to the privacy rights of the people of
California than the Fourth Amendment.391 If “independent state interest[s]”
are required to depart from the United States Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment analysis of student drug testing, those interests exist in this
context.392 The California Supreme Court has recognized that article I,
section 24 confirms the authority of the California courts “to adopt an
independent interpretation of the state Constitution.”393 Through a political
initiative, Californians amended their state constitution to explicitly protect

probationer if the probation officer was unaware of the search condition. People v.
Jaime P. (In re Jaime P.), 146 P.3d 965, 972 (Cal. 2006). The court found that juvenile
probationers enjoy a reasonable, albeit reduced, expectation of privacy. Id. at 970.
Balanced against that expectation of privacy are the “special needs” of the juvenile
probation system—rehabilitation of the minor and reduction of crime. Id. at 970–71.
Balancing those interests, the court concluded that requiring the probation officer to have
either reasonable suspicion for the search, or awareness of the search condition, would
justify the search. Id. at 972. Without reasonable suspicion or advance knowledge of the
condition, the probation search would be arbitrary. Id. Moreover, the doctrine of parens
patriae could not defeat the purpose of the exclusionary rule—deterring police
misconduct. Id. at 971. Finally, if juvenile offenders have a greater need for repeated
random searches, requiring the officers to be aware of the search condition would not
impair that need. Id. This same reasoning can be applied to student drug testing.
Students, like juvenile probationers, enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy. The “special
needs” of the school system—regulation of the students’ conduct and administration of
the academic curriculum—should be balanced against the students’ reduced expectation
of privacy. This should result in a requirement of reasonable suspicion for the drug testing of
students. Without reasonable suspicion, the drug testing would be arbitrary. The
doctrine of parens patriae should not be used to defeat the reasonableness requirement
of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution. Finally, if students have a need for
repeated searches, requiring school officials to articulate some reason for those searches
would not impair that need.
388. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 648 (1995).
389. Earls, 536 U.S. at 834; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661.
390. See supra text accompanying notes 19–39.
391. See supra text accompanying notes 341–43.
392. Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Cal. 1990).
393. Id.
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the right to privacy.394 And although the California Supreme Court has
stated that when “applied to police surveillance in the criminal context”
this right to privacy is not broader than that provided for in the Fourth
Amendment or article I, section 13 of the California Constitution,395 drug
testing by school officials does not involve law enforcement engaged in a
criminal case.396 Therefore, a higher degree of reasonableness should be
required to support these student searches. Furthermore, as a matter of
policy, Californians should not have the substance of their fundamental
rights under their state constitution defined by a federal law that has
proven to be inconsistent and uncertain.397
California courts have recognized that while in school, students have
an expectation of privacy, albeit reduced, in their persons and belongings.398
Consequently, a government search of the students’ persons and belongings

394. See supra text accompanying notes 114–18.
395. People v. Crowson, 660 P.2d 389, 392 (Cal. 1983).
396. See also People v. Superior Court (In re York), 892 P.2d 804, 813 (Cal. 1995),
in which the California Supreme Court found that in “the search and seizure context, the
article I, section 1 ‘privacy’ clause [of the California Constitution] has never been held to
establish a broader protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution or article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.” Consequently,
the court balanced the intrusion on privacy against the need for the policy and found that
a drug testing condition for those charged with a felony and released on their own
recognizance (OR) did not violate either the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 13.
Id. at 814–15. Because a defendant seeking OR release has a lesser expectation of
privacy than one not charged with a crime or one who has posted reasonable bail—one
consents to the drug testing condition in order to gain OR release and there are some
instances where there is a need for such a condition—the policy did not violate either the
Fourth Amendment or article I, section 13. Id. This contrasts sharply with students who
are not charged with a crime and who should not be required to consent to random drug
testing to exercise a constitutional right—access to free extracurricular activities while
exercising their constitutional right to a free public education.
397. See Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 89 (Pa. 2003). The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted the United States Supreme Court had “relaxed its
scrutiny” in regard to suspicionless, random searches of students from the time it decided
Vernonia to the time it decided Earls seven years later. Id. However, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found no reason to reconsider the test it formulated in In re F.B., 726
A.2d 361 (Pa. 1999), decided almost three years after the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Vernonia and four years before the Court’s decision in Earls. Theodore, 836
A.2d at 89. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court observed, “This is so not only because of
the heightened right to privacy existing under Article 1, Section 8, but also because of
sound state jurisprudential concerns. The necessity of maintaining a cogent, consistent,
and knowable state constitutional approach is particularly pressing where the
corresponding federal law has been changeable or uncertain.” Id. (emphasis added).
Compare Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995) (upholding random
drug testing for school athletes as constitutional), with Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (holding clandestine drug tests by state hospitals on pregnant
patients meeting certain criteria unconstitutional).
398. People v. William G. (In re William G.), 709 P.2d 1287, 1294–95 (Cal. 1985).
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must be supported by reasonable suspicion, rather than probable cause,
that the student has engaged or is engaging in a proscribed activity—a
violation of a school rule or a criminal statute.399 Whether it is search of
a student’s computer case, locker, backpack, purse, or person, there must
be an individualized suspicion that the student has violated some
regulation before he may be searched.400
In the case of random drug-testing programs, no such reasonable
suspicion exists.401 These are suspicionless tests of students merely
because they are engaged in athletics, cocurricular, and extracurricular
activities.402 There is no individualized suspicion that the particular
student tested has violated any rule or law.403 School officials are not
required to articulate any facts that the student tested has consumed any
drugs or alcohol. The students are randomly selected for testing. They
are pulled from their activities, taken to a bathroom, and monitored while
they urinate. Their urine is collected and analyzed. Due to this lack of
reasonable suspicion, it can be argued that these drug-testing programs
violate the students’ right to freedom from unreasonable searches under
the California Constitution.
There are cases that do allow for school searches on the basis of “special
needs” with less than reasonable suspicion.404 Those cases, however,
involve a potential threat to the safety of the entire student community
when there are no alternative means to deal with the threat.405 For
example, the California Court of Appeal applied the “special needs” test
when considering the use of handheld metal detectors to randomly
search for weapons on students406 or a pat-down search of a minor for
weapons who was not a student at the school.407
399. Id. at 1295; People v. Lisa G. (In re Lisa G.), 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 163, 165 (Ct.
App. 2005); People v. Cody S. (In re Cody S.), 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 653, 657 (Ct. App.
2004); People v. Alexander B. (In re Alexander B.), 270 Cal. Rptr. 342, 344 (Ct. App.
1990), overruled in part by In re Randy G., 28 P.3d 239, 246 (Cal. 2001).
400. See supra text accompanying notes 358–68.
401. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at
665.
402. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
403. Earls, 536 U.S. at 837; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665.
404. See, e.g., People v. Latasha W. (In re Latasha W.), 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 887
(Ct. App. 1998).
405. See, e.g., People v. Jose Y. (In re Jose Y.), 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 268, 270 (Ct. App.
2006); Latasha W., 70 Cal Rptr. 2d at 887.
406. Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 886–87.
407. Jose Y., 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 270–71.
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These types of searches differ from drug testing student athletes and
those engaged in extracurricular or cocurricular activities. Student
athletes or those who engage in extracurricular activities who consume
drugs and alcohol do not present the same type of threat to the school as
those who bring weapons to the school.408 Although a student who uses
drugs may be disruptive or harmful to himself, it is unlikely that he will
be physically dangerous to the entire student body.409 On the other hand,
as the court noted in In re Latasha, a student who brings a gun or a knife
to school poses a serious physical threat to the students and staff at the
school.410 Furthermore, handheld metal detectors, which cursorily search
over the clothes of a student, are less intrusive411 than the process of
monitoring a student’s urination, testing the urine for drugs, demanding
disclosure of the student’s medication history, and reporting the results
to the student, school officials, and student’s parents.412 Moreover, a
student athlete or student engaged in an extracurricular activity at the
school should enjoy significantly more privacy rights than a minor who
is not even a student at the school.413 Finally, unlike the unworkable
nature of reasonable suspicion for a weapons search,414 there is an
alternative means to confront the issue of students who attend school
under the influence of drugs—observe them.415 There are many individuals
—teachers, coaches, and staff—who can perceive if a student manifests
any of the telltale signs of a person under the influence—bloodshot eyes,
lethargic behavior, slurred speech, and lack of balance.416 Unlike the

408. Theodore v. Del. Valley Sch. Dist., 836 A.2d 76, 92 (Pa. 2003) (“Although we
do not for a moment downplay the seriousness of student use of drugs and alcohol, in
this post-Columbine High School era otherwise-undetected alcohol and drug use by
some students does not present the same sort of immediate and serious danger that is
presented when students introduce weapons into schools.”).
409. Id.
410. Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887.
411. Id. (“The searches in the present case were minimally intrusive. Only a
random sample of students was tested. Students were not touched during the search, and
were required to open pockets or jackets only if they triggered the metal detector.”).
412. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658–59 (1995); Theodore, 836
A.2d at 90 (“[T]he students’ privacy rights . . . cannot be viewed as a trivial incursion on
privacy. While students’ privacy expectations are lessened by virtue of their presence at
school, students may reasonably anticipate that the privacy associated with their
excretory functions will be diminished at school only modestly via the need to use public
restrooms. We also agree with Justice Breyer that many students could reasonably consider
production of a urine sample for testing to involve a greater imposition than the ordinary
use of a public restroom.”).
413. See supra text accompanying notes 375–77.
414. Latasha W., 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 887.
415. Gorman, supra note 280, at 176–77.
416. Neaderbaomer, supra note 293, at 65.
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NCAA in Hill, these teachers and coaches have consistent and frequent
contact with the students.417 These school officials can observe students
throughout the day and determine whether the student manifests any of
the many signs of intoxication.418 At this point, the student could be
tested. These articulable facts will suffice for reasonable suspicion, a
very low standard of proof.419 If a student must disclose the medication
he takes, his informational privacy interest is also impacted.
The California Supreme Court has also permitted seizures in schools
based on “special needs,” rather than reasonable suspicion, because
seizures are less intrusive than searches. As a result, a brief detention of
a student or a nonstudent is reasonable as long as the seizure is not
“arbitrary, capricious, or for the purposes of harassment.” Because drug
testing involves both a seizure and a search of a student, this reasoning
does not serve to justify drug testing.420
4. DNA Testing of Convicted Felons
The California courts’ recent examination of whether DNA testing of
various groups of individuals constitutes an unreasonable search is also
related to the discussion of student drug testing. In the DNA cases, the
courts addressed the constitutionality of testing individuals for nontraditional
criminal investigative purposes, just as courts are doing in the cases of
drug testing students. Consequently, these cases offer important legal
principles that may be applied to the issue of student drug testing.
California courts have repeatedly reviewed the issue of testing of
biological samples of convicted felons for collection and storage in a
DNA bank.421 Each time, the court has upheld its constitutionality.422

417. Gorman, supra note 280, at 176–77.
418. Id.
419. The Supreme Court has declared that “[r]easonable suspicion is a less
demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion
can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to
establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from
information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” Alabama v.
White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).
420. See supra text accompanying notes 378–83.
421. See, e.g., People v. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177 (Ct. App. 2006); People v.
Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Adams, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170
(Ct. App. 2004); People v. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 220 (Ct. App. 2000).
422. See infra text accompanying notes 428–73.
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The court has found that the nonconsensual collection of bodily fluids
for chemical testing constitutes a search and seizure under the Fourth
Amendment423 and article I, section 13 of the California Constitution.424
The courts have agreed that, in a typical criminal case, reasonableness is
determined by a warrant based on probable cause.425 When “special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable,” no warrant is required,
and the court simply balances the interests to determine reasonableness.426
Moreover, in other situations, “where there was no clear practice, either
approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the
constitutional provision was enacted,” the reasonableness of the search is
determined by balancing the interests.427
In People v. King, the court examined whether the DNA testing of
convicted sex offenders violated the Fourth Amendment.428 For various
reasons, the court found that such a DNA search did not require a
warrant based on probable cause.429 First of all, the search did not
involve a typical criminal investigation.430 In some instances, no crime
had been committed yet, and no investigation has begun.431 The person
tested is not necessarily a suspect and should not fear further intrusions
on his privacy.432 Moreover, the person searched, a convicted felon, is
already incarcerated, so his privacy is significantly reduced.433
The King court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
extraction of bodily fluids for DNA testing of convicted sex offenders
constituted a “special needs” search or whether it constituted a separate
category of searches in which a simple balancing of interests was
required.434 Instead, the court concluded that, because the withdrawal of
bodily fluids was not the type of search that was “either approved or
423. People v. Calvin S. (In re Calvin S.), 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 561 (Ct. App.
2007); Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 603; Adams, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 180; King, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 224.
424. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 185.
425. King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 224.
426. Id.
427. Id. at 225.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 226.
430. Id. at 225.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 228 (“It therefore is unnecessary to determine if the taking of samples for
DNA analysis might be deemed to answer to ‘special needs,’ beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, or if it presents a separate category of search to which the per se
requirement of probable cause does not apply.” (internal citations omitted)).
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disapproved at the time the Fourth Amendment was enacted,” it was not
the typical type of search undertaken in most criminal cases.435 The
privacy interests involved here were substantially diminished, and therefore,
a simple balancing of interests would suffice to determine the reasonableness
of the search.436
The court concluded that the government’s interests outweighed the
individual’s interests.437 Pursuant to a statute, the government secures
bodily fluids of convicted felons within a specific class.438 There is no
discretion as to who should be targeted. Every convicted sexual offender
within the class is tested.439 There may not be an ongoing investigation
when the fluid is collected.440 The fluid is taken merely for informational
purposes so it can be stored in the DNA bank.441 The government
undertakes this task in an attempt to deter or prevent future crimes, solve
past crimes, and ensure that innocent persons are not wrongfully convicted.442
DNA testing is considered a highly effective tool in this effort.443
On the other hand, those affected are convicted sex offenders.444
Although prisoners retain some privacy interests, those interests are
substantially reduced. 445 Their freedom of movement is drastically
curtailed.446 The inmates are subjected to regular searches for weapons
and contraband. 447 They are fingerprinted, photographed, and the
government maintains a permanent record of their identity.448 Sex
offenders are subjected to medical tests for specific diseases.449 The
435. Id.
436. Id. (“Whether the DNA testing procedures pass muster under the Fourth
Amendment should be determined by balancing their intrusion on the individual’s privacy
interests against their promotion of legitimate governmental interests. And in determining if
the balance permits warrantless, suspicionless testing, we consider the scope of the particular
intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place
in which it is conducted.”).
437. Id. at 229.
438. Id. at 225.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 227.
443. Id.
444. Id.
445. Id. at 226.
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 227.
449. Id. at 226.
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nature of the intrusion—a blood test—is commonplace and minimally
intrusive.450 Consequently, the court found the government’s need for
the program outweighed the prisoner’s interest in privacy, and it upheld
the DNA profiling in this case.
In subsequent cases, the court reached the same result. In Alfaro v.
Terhune, the plaintiffs argued the unconstitutionality of a statute requiring
those convicted of murder and sentenced to death to provide biological
specimens for testing and storage in the state DNA bank.451 The plaintiffs
contended that one of the main objectives of the act—deterrence—was
inapplicable in the case before the court because the plaintiffs had been
sentenced to death.452 Consequently, the government’s interest did not
outweigh the individual’s interest in privacy.453
The court rejected this argument. On the one hand, those convicted of
murder and sentenced to death have diminished privacy interests.454
Nonconsensual extraction of biological samples is minimally intrusive.455
On the other hand, the government’s interest is compelling.456 The DNA
bank provides an accurate system to prevent and correct erroneous
convictions.457 It also helps to solve past crimes.458 Lastly, the court found
that even those sentenced to death are still capable of committing future
crimes while in prison.459
In People v. Adams, the court also rejected the “special needs”
requirement and relied on a simple balancing test to uphold the DNA
testing of those convicted of serious felonies.460 The court found no
“special needs” were required because “the class of persons subject to
the Act is convicted criminals, not the general population . . . [who] do
not enjoy the same expectation of privacy that nonconvicts do.”461 Those
convicted of such serious offenses as murder, rape, and kidnapping have
a reduced expectation of privacy.462 The government’s “compelling”
interest in deterring or preventing crime and prosecuting crimes accurately

450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
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Id. at 229.
Alfaro v. Terhune, 120 Cal. Rptr. 2d 197, 201 (Ct. App. 2002).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 208.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
People v. Adams, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 170, 182 (Ct. App. 2004).
Id.
Id. at 183.
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outweighed the convicted criminals’ minimal privacy interest.463 In
People v. Travis and People v. Johnson, the respective courts found that
statutes permitting the collection of bodily fluids from all convicted
felons for DNA profiling were constitutional.464 Even though the statute
expanded the “search” to all convicted felons and not all felonies are
serious or violent, the courts found the government’s legitimate interest
in “maintaining a permanent, reliable record of identification of all
convicted felons remains unassailable.”465 This interest, along with the
government’s interest in deterring, preventing, and solving crimes,
outweighed the minor intrusion on the convicted felon’s reduced interest
in privacy.466
Lastly, the California Court of Appeal found that a California statute
requiring all juvenile convicted felons to provide a DNA sample for the
state’s DNA data bank is constitutional.467 Despite the special confidentiality
protections of the juvenile court proceedings, the court found that juveniles
do not have a stronger interest in privacy than their adult counterparts.468
These special judicial protections have no effect on the limited intrusion
on privacy that results from the extraction of bodily fluids for DNA
testing.469 The DNA profile may not be released to the public and may
only be used by law enforcement for criminal identification or exclusion.470
Balanced against the minor intrusion on the juvenile’s interest in privacy
is the government’s significant interest in protecting the public and
rehabilitating the minor.471 The DNA bank serves these interests by
accurately prosecuting crimes and deterring and preventing crimes by
those juveniles who have already committed felonies.472 Consequently,

463. Id. at 182.
464. People v. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177, 192 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. Johnson, 43
Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 588 (Ct. App. 2006).
465. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 192.
466. Id.
467. People v. Calvin S. (In re Calvin S.), 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559, 563 (Ct. App.
2007). For an analysis and critique of this statute, see Steven Messner, Comment, Law
Enforcement DNA Database: Jeopardizing the Juvenile Justice System Under California’s
Criminal DNA Collection Law, 28 J. JUV. L. 159 (2007).
468. Calvin S., 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 562.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 563.
472. Id.
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the government’s legitimate interests outweighed the limited intrusion
on the minor’s privacy.473
5. Drug Testing Students
With respect to DNA testing of convicted felons, the California courts
have dispensed with the traditional requirements of either a search warrant
or reasonable suspicion, and instead simply balanced the competing
interests. There is an argument for dispensing with reasonable suspicion in
the student drug-testing cases. Like the DNA-testing cases, drug testing
of student athletes and those engaged in extracurricular or cocurricular
activities does not involve a typical criminal case. The student who is
tested is not a criminal suspect. He is not being investigated for a criminal
offense. The student should not fear further intrusions on his privacy
after he is initially drug tested.
Unlike the DNA testing of convicted sexual offenders or death row
inmates, however, not every student athlete or extracurricular participant
is tested.474 Only those students who are randomly selected are tested.475
Because the system is random, some students may never be tested, but
others may be tested repeatedly. Unlike DNA testing of all convicted
felons, there is a focus on one or two students who are selected for
testing.476 Those students may feel anxious or fearful that they have been
singled out for testing for no reason. Without warning, in front of the
rest of their classmates, these students are removed from their classroom
and are accompanied to the bathroom where they are monitored as they
urinate. School officials are trying to determine if those students have
violated the rules by attending classes under the influence of drugs or
alcohol. If they test positive for drug use, then consequences, such as
suspension from the team or the extracurricular activity, will follow.477
Although DNA testing is an effective means of identifying the
perpetrator of a crime, there is significant debate as to the effectiveness
of student drug testing in accomplishing its goals.478 The advocates of
drug testing in the schools strongly urge that it is an effective deterrent

473. Id.
474. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995); People v. King, 99
Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 223 (Ct. App. 2000).
475. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 650.
476. See id.
477. Id. at 651.
478. See supra text accompanying notes 325–29.
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for student drug use.479 Several studies have raised serious doubts as to
whether drug testing in schools accomplishes this goal.480 Although drug
testing may serve to identify drug users, there is no scientific evidence
that it serves to deter them or other students from drug use.481
Finally, can the diminished expectation of privacy faced by a student
athlete or one engaged in extracurricular or cocurricular activities be
compared to that of a convicted felon? The courts have repeatedly stated
that incarceration results in “a significant reduction in the expectation of
privacy.”482 The freedom of movement and the right to be free from
government intrusion is greatly diminished for incarcerated felons.483 On
the other hand, the California Supreme Court has made it clear that “public
school students do not shed their constitutional rights upon reaching the
schoolhouse door.”484
Students have a reduced expectation of privacy.485 According to the
Supreme Court, the student athletes should expect even less privacy
because they shower, change clothes, and dress with other student
athletes.486 They undergo medical exams in order to compete and subject
themselves to the rules and regulations of the athletic team.487 Students
who engage in extracurricular or cocurricular activities do not engage in
such intimate activities as showering and changing clothes, but some do
travel together and must adhere to special rules and regulations pertaining to
their activities. 488 This results in an intrusion on their privacy.489
Nonetheless, can these limited reductions in privacy compare in any real

479. See David G. Evans, Model Legislation for Student Drug-Testing Programs, 2
DRUG TESTING LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND PRACTICE app. p at 533 (2007); Joseph R.
McKinney, The Effectiveness and Legality of Random Student Drug Testing Programs
Revisited, 205 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 21 (2006); ROBERT L. DUPONT ET AL., INST. FOR
BEHAVIOR & HEALTH, PRELIMINARY STUDY: ELEMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL SCHOOL-BASED
STUDENT DRUG TESTING PROGRAM 12 (2009), http://www.preventionnotpunishment.org/pdfs/
ElementsofaSuccessfulSchoolBasedStudentDrugTestingProgram.pdf.
480. See supra text accompanying notes 327–29.
481. See supra text accompanying notes 325–27.
482. People v. Travis, 44 Cal. Rptr. 3d 177, 187 (Ct. App. 2006); People v. King, 99
Cal. Rptr. 2d 220, 226 (Ct. App. 2000).
483. Travis, 44 Cal Rptr. 3d at 187; King, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 227–29.
484. People v. William G. (In re William G.), 709 P.2d 1287, 1291 (Cal. 1985).
485. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995).
486. Id.
487. Id. at 656–57.
488. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 832 (2002).
489. Id.
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way with the reduction in privacy confronted by a convicted felon? It is
difficult to fathom that the California Constitution, which, in the past,
has provided greater substantive protection under article I, section 13 than
the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,490 would treat the intrusion
on privacy of a student athlete or of a student engaged in extracurricular
or cocurricular activities equivalently to that of a convicted sex offender
or a death row inmate.
V. CONCLUSION
California schools are currently drug testing student athletes and
students engaged in extracurricular or cocurricular activities. Although
these drug-testing programs may meet federal constitutional standards
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Vernonia and Earls, the
results may differ under the California Constitution.
California student drug-testing programs should be evaluated under
the state constitution’s right to privacy and right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures. The right to privacy under article I,
section 1 explicitly guarantees Californians the right to privacy. It
protects privacy more broadly than the Federal Constitution. In the past,
the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under article
I, section 13 has also provided greater protection than its federal
counterpart. The constitutionality of these programs under the California
Constitution depends on the specific details of each drug-testing program.
Therefore, it is critical to ascertain: who is tested? how is the test
conducted? to whom are the test results revealed? has the school
demonstrated a drug problem among its student population? and has it
shown that there is significant drug abuse among the targeted students?
Due to the lack of any scientific research establishing that drug testing
deters student drug use and depending on the specific attributes of the
drug-testing program, the California courts could certainly conclude, as
the Pennsylvania and Washington Supreme Courts have, that the student
drug-testing programs violate the California Constitution.

490.
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